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How stable and general is behavior once reached maximum learning? To answer this ques-
tion and understand post-acquisition behavior and its related individual differences, we pro-
pose a psychological principle that naturally extends the basic associative single-cue Rescorla–
Wagner model (which may also be called Hull model) of Pavlovian conditioning to (i) a frame-
work of dynamical models predicting resistance to learning in the first few sessions followed
by an over-optimal response peak. In turn, (ii) the theory can be further extended to describe
response fluctuations by the laws of quantum mechanics. (iii) We also introduce an indepen-
dent model characterized by the presence of a stochastic noise of cognitive origin. We ran an
unusually long experiment with 32 rats over 3960 trials, where we excluded habituation and
other well-known phenomena as sources of variability in the subjects’ performance. There is
weak to positive evidence that Hull model is the best nonlinear regression to averaged data only
for a minority of the subjects, while its dynamical extension (i) can explain the totality of data.
The noise encountered in all individual responses is white, thus confirming the simplest version
of model (iii) but standing in contrast with the colored-noise findings in human performance.
Finally, data are compatible with the quantum extension (ii), although experimental uncertain-
ties dominate the result. On the other hand, data do not favor models with (iv) a long-memory
effect or (v) where response variability is solely described by a random fractal.
Keywords: Pavlovian conditioning, Hull/Rescorla–Wagner model, Extended training,
Inhibition with reinforcement, Individual differences, Bayes information criterion, Stochastic
learning models, 1/ f noise
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INTRODUCTION
How stable is behavior when there is nothing more to
learn? Much debate has been flourished around this ba-
sic question since the earliest studies of animal condition-
ing (Pavlov, 1927), especially after the first efforts to make
the discipline theoretically quantitative with a mathematical
approach (Hull, 1943). Observations point towards an insta-
bility of the response in extended training. In the context
of discrimination experiments of operant conditioning, ex-
tended training was studied in relation with behavioral con-
trast and the peak-shift effect. Pigeons trained for 60 days
with interspersed generalization testing showed a gradual re-
sponse decrease (Terrace, 1966). In an experiment lasting 64
sessions, Hearst (1971) did not observe this decrease from
peak responding, sometimes called overtraining effect (as a
reduction in behavioral contrast), inhibition with reinforce-
ment, or post-peak depression (see Kimmel and Burns, 1975,
for an early review and other references). Extending the
training to 105-125 days, the response decrease was found
to be a subject-dependent and transient effect, giving way to
a greater variety of patterns characterized by apparently ran-
dom response fluctuations and, in general, remarkable indi-
vidual differences (Dukhayyil and Lyons, 1973). An attenu-
ated conditioned responding with extended reinforced train-
ing has been observed also in the case of Pavlovian condi-
tioning, where is modulated by the context (Bouton et al.,
2008; Overmier et al., 1979; Urcelay et al., 2012). Post-
peak depression is a rather short-scale phenomenon usu-
ally achieved within a few sessions and not too many trials.
For instance, the experiments with dogs by Overmier et al.
(1979) showed response decrease on a time scale of 300 tri-
als. In the experiments of Bouton et al. (2008), the groups of
subjects received about two weeks of training. In the case of
Urcelay et al. (2012), they were given 5 to 6 sessions of 5 to
60 trials, for a maximum of about 360 trials. For acquisition
of fear conditioning, 100 pairings during 10 days are suffi-
cient (Pickens et al., 2009). However, longer-term cases are
known, such as the first documented case of inhibition with
reinforcement. Pavlov (1927, Lecture XIV) reported experi-
ments with a dog that spanned several years and that showed
a progressive decrease in the conditioned response when the
same type of stimuli were applied. On the other extreme of
the spectrum, response fluctuations have been registered also
on the very short time scale of trial by trial (Ayres et al.,
1979).
The prototypical learning curve of Pavlovian condition-
ing in the presence of a single cue was described by Hull
in his renown book (Hull, 1943), while a few years later
Estes (1950) and Bush and Mosteller (1951a) wrote down
a precise mathematical model (somewhat implicit in Hull’s
discussion) in terms of response probability, and that gave
rise to a linear incremental equation. For operational rea-
sons, the latter was replaced by the association strength v by
Rescorla and Wagner (1972). Due to this complicated gene-
sis, the resulting single-cue model in terms of v has received
several names: Hull, Hull–Spence, Estes, Bush–Mosteller,
and single-cue Rescorla–Wagner, among others (Le Pelley,
2004; Wagner & Vogel, 2009). For brevity, we will call it
Hull model here.
Including Hull’s, most conditioning models are about
learning, which means that their simulation of the execution
or reaction of the subject once the asymptote is reached has
not been validated extensively. A classic problem consists in
that, when one has learned everything, it is not convenient
to keep giving attention to the stimuli of the task and there
is a transition to a more automatic mode of execution. In
order to explain this transition, many Pavlovian models (e.g.,
the Pearce–Hall model, 1980) distinguish between automatic
and controlled processing. Still, this difference plays a role
in the first few sessions of training and it does not address the
issue of what happens after thousand of trials. Going beyond
associative models, the opponent-processes theory (Solomon
and Corbit, 1974) and the SOP model (Wagner, 1981) pro-
vide a partial, but not entirely comprehensive, explanation of
post-peak depression and related phenomena.
These studies also highlight the parallel issue of individual
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differences. An obvious feature of individual plots is their
non-smoothness and erratic nature, to the point where any
vestige of the clean, smooth learning curve of averaged data
may be completely lost. When averaging, information on in-
dividuals is usually lost. This concern is not new and it was
voiced already in early days of the discipline (Hayes, 1953;
Merrill, 1931; Sidman, 1952) and retaken into consideration
in recent years (Blanco and Moris, 2017; Gallistel, 2012;
Gallistel et al., 2004; Glautier, 2013; Jaksic et al., 2018;
Young, 2018; see especially the refreshing point of view of
Smith and Little, 2018). As Sidman (1952) pessimistically
put it, “[i]ntra-organism variability may be so great as to ob-
scure any lawful relation.” Smooth group-learning curves
have even been stigmatized as an artifact, since step-like
sudden acquisition has been observed in several experiments
(Gallistel et al., 2004). Despite these warnings, however, av-
eraging the data can be a useful procedure (Estes, 1956) and
is still commonly employed in the great majority of publi-
cations, even those where individual responses are analyzed
(Mazur and Hastie, 1978).
All this literature helps to refocus the question we pro-
posed in the opening and to give the term “stability” two dif-
ferent meanings. One corresponds to intra-subject behavior
stability: the variability of the individual response through-
out the experiment. The other is inter-subject stability, in
the sense of the range and variety of patterns that individual
differences can take when the performance of experimental
subjects is compared. Both intra- and inter-subject stability
can refer to phenomena spanning trials (short-term stability)
or sessions (long-term stability). Short-term stability usually
pertains to the initial acquisition stage of conditioning, where
the subjects are in the process of acquiring maximal learning
but have not quite reached the asymptote of their learning
curve. Long-term stability is more related to response at
the asymptote. Response variations in the form of random
fluctuations may be regarded both as short-term effects (they
occur as gradients from one session to another) and as long-
term, since they can span several sessions (or when one de-
tects oscillation-like features with a long period).
To the best of our knowledge, the mainstream of mathe-
matical associative models starting from Hull’s predicts an
indefinitely long asymptotic permanence of execution in the
learning process, for each and any subject. Neither indi-
vidual differences nor response fluctuations are considered
in most analytic treatments of the theories, notwithstanding
the number of exceptions to this generalized trend, some
of which we have mentioned above. A reversion of this
trend has been seen recently, when new models have arisen
that give more importance to individual differences. The
multiple-state learning model of Blanco and Moris (2017)
and the MECAmodel of Glautier (2013) are examples. Also,
Este’s stimulus sampling theory (1950) is one of the earli-
est attempts to quantify and explain variability in learning
progress, as due to fluctuations in environmental and inter-
nal factors. The issue at stake here is not just whether there
exist superior ad hoc fits to averaged data than that provided
by Hull model with one cue. It is already known that other
types of learning curves can fare better than the exponen-
tial profile (see Eq. (4) below), even at the individual level.
A power-law curve (Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981) or the
accumulation model (Mazur and Hastie, 1978) are two in-
stances. Rather, here we are interested in the problem of sta-
bility in the double sense specified above and, moreover, any
new model should arise as an underlying theory rather than
just a tailor-made learning curve.
With the aim to study both very long-term stability and in-
dividual differences, we present the results of an experiment
of Pavlovian conditioning that ran through a total of 3960
trials. The first goal of this paper is to check how variable is
behavior in the long-term post-acquisition phase. We do find
fluctuations around the asymptote, both on a trial-by-trial
and a session-by-session basis, but not statistically signifi-
cant. In other words, behavior is fairly stable even when the
subject is no longer learning. This provides a validation of
Hull (Rescorla–Wagner single-cue) associative model even
in the not-so-often explored plateau region of the learning
curve, far away from initial acquisition. However, the fit of
the data of individual subjects is much more unstable and
one may wonder whether there exist a quantitative model ac-
counting for this variability. Our second goal is to explore
several associative models extending Hull’s and Rescorla–
Wagner’s in a most natural way, introducing a psychological
principle that, in analogy with the same tool used in classi-
cal1 mechanics physics, we will call of least action. This
principle states that learning processes must be described as
dynamical systems, where dynamicalmeans that there exists
a quantity (the action) that must be minimized when the as-
sociation strength is changed during conditioning. Indepen-
dently, we will also introduce a model governed by a random
noise. Through a detailed statistical and spectral analysis,
we show that, despite the large fluctuations of the subjects’
behavior, Hull model is still a good fit to data, except in 4 out
of 15 experimental subjects. An extension (not a competi-
tor) of Hull model based on the principle of least action and
predicting resistance to learning in the first sessions provides
a better fit to the data of this 20% of the sample, according
to both Bayesian and Akaike Information Criteria. Although
the existence of a learning asymptote has been questioned in
the past (Gallistel et al., 2004), we find its presence to be a
robust feature of all the models. The formalism we propose
can be extended to the multi-cue and varying-salience cases
and can account for the non-normative performance of some
1To avoid an otherwise inevitable confusion, in this paper we
use the term “classical” always in the sense of physics, calling the
traditional associative models of conditioning “Pavlovian.”
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subjects.
One of the main novelties of this work is that traditional
associative models are not extended in an ad hoc way, but
by using a rigorous top-down procedure leading to a natural
(in the sense of logic-based) conclusion, closer to a theory
rather than a phenomenological model. To that aim, we need
mathematics more advanced than those available to a large
portion of the readership in psychology, but the payback of-
fered in terms of explanation of the data may be worthwhile.
In order to keep the presentation simple, we will introduce
all models in a pedagogical way, confining the most rigorous
parts to appendices.
The plan of the article is the following. We first review
Hull’s associative model in section Hull model: single-cue
Rescorla–Wagner and clarify whether it should be applied
to individual subjects or to their average. In order to clarify
the type of phenomena we would like to explore, in section
A long experiment on Pavlovian conditioning, we present a
3960-trial-long experiment, with a first analysis centered on
the average learning curve. Two alternative models of in-
dividual conditioning are discussed in sections Dynamical
models of individual behavior (a general framework where
we reformulate Hull model and introduce a newmodel where
subjects initially show resistance to learning) and Colored
stochastic model of individual behavior, where we formulate
a descriptive model and contrast it with the data,finding that
the latter are always characterized by white noise. In section
Quantum Hull model, we present a predictive theory where
random fluctuations of the subject response are described by
the mathematics of quantum mechanics. Data neither rule
out nor confirm this theory and one cannot discard the in-
terpretation of response variability as quantum fluctuations.
Final remarks are collected in section General conclusions.
The Appendices are devoted to material that would disrupt
the flow of the main text. Appendix A presents dynam-
ical associative models and, in particular, the Hull model
with friction. In Appendix B, we consider relevant appli-
cations of the dynamical approach for future checks of the
theory, especially to the Rescorla–Wagner and Mackintosh
models. In Appendix C, we consider scenarios which are ex-
cluded, or at least not confirmed, by the data: one encoding
a long-memory effect and one where response variability is
described by a random fractal. The basics of spectral analysis
are discussed in Appendix D. In Appendix E, we present the
detailed mathematical construction of the quantum model,
while in Appendix F some technical considerations related
to it are collected.
HULL MODEL: SINGLE-CUE
RESCORLA–WAGNER
According to the model developed by C. L. Hull, the as-
sociation between the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the un-
conditioned stimulus (US) in Pavlovian training can be mea-
0 1 2 3 4
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
t
v
Figure 1. Learning curve: the solution (3) v(t) (vertical axis)
of Hull’s conditioning model (2) as a function of time t (hor-
izontal axis), for c = λ = 1 and αβ = 1 (excitatory condition-
ing).
sured, at the n-th trial or session, by the operational variable
vn, called association strength. Usually in the literature, this
is denoted with Vn, but here we use a small letter to avoid
confusion with the potentials introduced below. The change
∆vn := vn − vn−1 in the strength of the association at the n-th
trial is
∆vn = αβ(λ − vn−1) , n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , (1)
where 0 6 α 6 1 is the salience of the CS, 0 6 β 6 1
is the salience of the US, and 0 6 λ 6 1 is the magnitude
of the US. For convenience, we promote the trial sequence
n = 1, 2, 3, . . . to a continuous time process described by a
continuous time variable t. This approximation is valid as
long as we consider many trials or sessions. In this way, we
can recast Eq. (1) as the first-order differential equation
v˙ = αβ(λ − v) , (2)
where a dot denotes a derivative with respect to time, v˙ :=
dv(t)/dt. Its general solution is
v(t) = λ − ce−αβt , (3)
where c is a constant. The initial condition at t = 0 of this
solution is v(0) = λ − c, while v(+∞) = λ. Therefore, for ex-
citatory conditioning c = λ > 0 (Fig. 1), while for extinction
λ = 0 and c < 0, so that v = |c| exp(−αβt) decreases in time.
In this article, we will consider only excitatory condition-
ing and attempt, among other possibilities, to fit data with the
monotonic learning curve
vexcit(t) = λ
(
1 − e−αβt
)
. (4)
This theoretical curve has two free parameters: λ and the
product αβ. In the experiment below, we will not be able to
determine the salience of the CS and US separately.
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At the risk of stating the obvious, it should be noted that
there are two ways in which to interpret Eqs. (2) and (4). One
is as an associative model for individuals, in which case v(t)
is the association strength at a given time t of a given subject.
If Hull model were a reliable description of reality, all sub-
jects should obey the model with reasonable accuracy and
differ in their behavior only in the value of the parameters λ,
α, and β in the aforementioned equations. However, this in-
terpretation is too restrictive and does not allow for individual
differences in the learning process, something that any ex-
perimentalist would recognize as inevitable. However, if the
majority of subjects obeyed Hull model, then the latter could
be regarded as valid in average, in which case we will make
it explicit that the association strength appearing in Eqs. (2)
and (4) should be replaced by the average 〈v〉 := ∑Ni=1 vi/N
over the subjects:
˙〈v〉 = αβ(λ − 〈v〉) , 〈v〉excit(t) = λ
(
1 − e−αβt
)
. (5)
As we will see in this article, Hull model is a good de-
scription of Pavlovian learning both for individuals and in
average. However, we do find individual differences which
can be better described by an extension of the model which
we will dub “dynamical,” and which does not improve aver-
aged data significantly. Therefore, we will strictly keep the
distinction between models for individuals (v) and in average
(〈v〉).
A LONG EXPERIMENT ON PAVLOVIAN
CONDITIONING
Subjects
32 male Wistar Han non-naïve rats (Charles River Labo-
ratories) were used. These rats proceeded from three differ-
ent operant-conditioning experiments conducted in the same
laboratory, but they had no prior overt training in Pavlovian
conditioning nor they had been trained in the same appara-
tus. The characteristics of previous experiments were such
that any significant influence on the present work is most un-
likely.
Four subjects began the experiment with 43 weeks of age
and ended 15 weeks later. 18 subjects started with 39 weeks
and 10 subjects with 21 weeks; all of them ended 10 weeks
later. The average age at the beginning and end of the exper-
iment was of, respectively, 33.9 ± 8.8 and 44.5 ± 9.5 weeks.
The subjects were kept in individual identical cages of size
19 (h) × 23.5 (w) × 35.5 (l) cm (non-enriched environment)
with unrestricted water supply and a restricted diet of food to
maintain 100% of their theoretical body weight. The average
theoretical weight was of 418 ± 25 g. In theory, therefore,
animals were neither food nor water deprived.
This study received approval by the local research ethics
committee.
Materials
Four identical conditioning boxes were used. Each ex-
perimental box was 35.5 cm in length by 29 cm in height
and 24.5 cm in depth, and was enclosed within a sound-
attenuating chest, equipped with a fan, which provided ven-
tilation and masking noise, a fluorescent lamp (20W), which
served as houselight, and a window for observation in the
frontal part. The front panel of each experimental chamber
was of aluminum, the posterior panel was of black metal, and
the remaining walls were made of transparent plexiglass.
Two syringes connected to water bombs were installed in
the back of the front panel. The water-bomb device was de-
signed at the Department of Basic Psychology I at UNED
and made by CIBERTEC (Madrid, Spain). It consisted in a
24 V DC pinch-type electrovalve by ASCO placed between a
60 ml depot and a capillary exit, connected by a silicon tube
(1.74 mm external diameter, approximately 10 cm length).
The exit was connected to a metal water tube, 5 mm of diam-
eter, which protruded 4 cm into the experimental chamber.
Each water tube was located at the sides of the front panel
(10 cm from the food magazine). Throughout the experi-
ment, only one tube was active, the other one being inert.
The contact of the tongue of the rats with the water tube re-
sulted in the activation of the bomb during 0.1 s, whenever
this response was reinforced; otherwise licks were registered
and the liquid was not delivered.
As for the US, we prepared two solutions of water and sac-
charin (sodium saccharin hydrate, Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis,
MO) at 0.1% (1 g/l) and 0.2% (2 g/l), respectively, less
than aversive concentrations (& 0.3%), much less than toxic
dosage (14.2 g/Kg for rats), and for a much shorter time in-
ducing liver inflammation (0.3 g/l for six months for mice;
Bian et al., 2017); see also Fujita et al. (2009). The 0.1%
concentration was strong enough for subjects to discriminate
it from plain water (saccharin concentrations as low as 0.05%
have been used in the literature; see Swithers and Hall, 1994).
A 0.2% concentration was successfully used in the literature
as an appetitive stimulus (Bernal et al., 2008; Sclafani and
Ackroff, 1994). The solutions were conserved in two one-
liter jars in a laboratory fridge at constant temperature and
were freshly remade weekly according to consumption by
the subjects during the experimental sessions. The jars were
taken out of the fridge to reach laboratory temperature (21◦C)
before the start of the first session of the day.
Experimental and control programs were written in PAS-
CAL language and executed in the boxes via MED-PC IV R©
(Med Associates Inc., Fairfax, VT), which also recorded the
responses. Data analysis was performed with Microsoft Ex-
cel and Wolfram Mathematica.
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Figure 2. Structure of a trial for the experimental groups as
described in the text.
Experimental design
The experiment was divided into three phases. In the first
phase of pre-training, subjects were exposed to the basic
functioning of the liquid dispenser in the conditioning boxes.
Drops of saccharin solution of the concentration correspond-
ing to the rat’s group were delivered according to a variable-
time 5 s schedule (VT-5), implemented as a uniform random
distribution between 3 and 7 s with steps of 1 s. Each lick
was reinforced by the delivery of another drop via a fixed-
ratio schedule (FR-1). Each session of pre-training lasted 10
minutes and was preceded by 30 s of darkness, lasting in total
10’30”.
The second phase (training) consisted in sessions of total
duration of 2259 s (about 37’40”). After 30 s of darkness,
each box was lighted and the session went through for 44
trials, ending with 10 s of inactivity. Figure 2 is a scheme
of a trial for the experimental groups. An inter-trial interval
(ITI) of variable length averaging 40 s, realized by a uni-
form random distribution between 20 and 60 s with steps of
4 s, was followed by the CS, a tone of 85 db, 600 Hz, and a
fixed 10 s duration. The intensity of the tone was well above
the average ambient noise inside each box (65 db).During
the CS, a US consisting in one drop of saccharin solution
was delivered at random intervals of 5 s (RI-5). A random-
interval schedule (Millenson, 1963) establishes a fixed non-
zero chance of US delivery every second. In particular, an
RI-5 has a 20% chance per second to deliver one drop, hence
one drop falls every 1 s/0.2 = 5 s in average, i.e., twice per
CS. Thus, an average of 88 US per session were delivered,
roughly ranging between 70 and 110 drops. Each session
ended 10 s after the end of the last CS.
The structure of the trials for control groups was the same
except for the schedule of delivery of the US: an RI-25 span-
ning the whole duration of the trial, so that a US could
equally occur during the CS and at any other moment of the
trial. This corresponds to the delivery of the same amount of
solution per trial as for the experimental groups: one drop ev-
ery 25 seconds in average, 4% chance of delivery per second,
average of 2 drops per trial.
The third and last phase was extinction, the only difference
with respect to previous training sessions being the absence
of liquid in the drinking dispensers.
Procedure
The subjects were distributed into four groups of 8 rats:
Group 1 (subjects 1-1, 1-2, . . . , 1-8) for a US consisting in
one drop of 0.1% saccharin solution, Group 2 (subjects 2-1
to 2-8) for a US consisting in one drop of 0.2% saccharin
solution and two control groups with the same concentra-
tion (Group 1C, subjects 1C-1 to 1C-8, 0.1%; Group 2C,
subjects 2C-1 to 2C-8, 0.2%) but randomized US delivery
as explained in the previous subsection. Although the sub-
jects were naïve in terms of Pavlovian explicit training, their
provenance from three operant experiments was counterbal-
anced in each group as an extra measure of precaution to
minimize the effect of uncontrollable variables due to their
past history.
On the first day, all subjects went through the phase of pre-
training, consisting in two consecutive sessions of the pre-
training described in the previous subsection. On the same
day or the day after, session 1 of the training phase was run
upon the subjects. The total duration of the experiment was
90 sessions, run once or twice per day with an inter-session
interval ranging from a minimum of 1 hour and 30 minutes
to about 3 hours and 30 minutes. The day after session 90,
we moved all subjects through two consecutive sessions of
extinction.
Results
To compare data with the theoretical model, one has to be
careful about the identification of the association strength. In
our experimental design, the US is presented simultaneously
with the CS and one must account for the responses directly
due to the US. For this reason, we subtract the number of US
(which varies from trial to trial and from session to session),
to the total number of licks per session and we identify
v = (number of licks during CS) − (number of US) . (6)
Thus, whenever we talk about licks during the CS in session-
by-session data, we always imply that the number of uncon-
ditioned responses (responses following the delivery of an
US) has been discounted. In this way, at the beginning of
training animals responded only upon presentation of the US
and the total number of licks is of the same order of magni-
tude as the number of US presented. A minor issue is that
under-response generates negative values of v, but this does
not correspond to inhibition. While under-response at the
beginning of training means that the animal does not know
that the CS predicts the US, inhibition would imply that the
animal knows that the CS predicts the no-US. Since negative
v’s appear only in the very first sessions, this feature does not
influence whatsoever the focus of our research on the rest of
the data.
In Eq. (6), we defined unconditioned responses as those
occurring in the presence of the US and assumed that the
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number of US is equivalent to the number of unconditioned
responses. However, this assumption does not account for
the following situation. It could be that, sometimes, the sub-
ject did not lick upon delivery of the US and that it licked
instead afterwards, in the absence of the US (vacuum lick-
ing). Although a single drop stayed clung to the dispenser,
the short delivery of two US could make the merger of the
first and second drop fall before the animal could lick, at
which point vacuum licking would take place. All these fine
details are not important for the final interpretation of the re-
sults, because replacing (6) with a different operational defi-
nition of v would lead to very small quantitative differences.
For example, we checked that considering, in alternative, the
number of licks during the CS (not discounting the number
of US), the number of licks per reinforcer (number of licks
during CS)/(number of US), or the number of CS licks minus
the number of post-CS licks does not change the plots quali-
tatively, and response variability remains at the same levels.
In trial-by-trial data, we will not subtract the number of
US to the actual response by the animal. The reason is that
we will be interested in these data when considering the noise
component of the signal (see below for details). A random-
ized US delivery would produce a white noise averaging to
zero and of much smaller amplitude than any other source of
noise (statistical error or some intrinsic effect to be checked
upon).
Before commenting on the main data, some general re-
marks about the experimental design are in order.
• Unrestricted access to water away from experimental
sessions and a controlled diet set at 100% of the theoretical
body weight guaranteed that the response of the subjects was
not driven by either thirst or hunger. This was done to isolate
purely associative effects beyond Hull model.
• The choice of a tone was made to avoid sign tracking
and reduce alternative activities inside the box.
• Randomization of the inter-trial interval prevents the
subject to use the latter as a predictor of the US, thus guar-
anteeing that the association is made between the CS and the
US only.
• The design of simultaneous conditioning (US delivered
during the CS instead of after) was forced upon us by some
unavoidable technical characteristics of the available condi-
tioning boxes. When the electrovalve open to release the
drop of saccharin solution, the mechanism produces a click
sound. We checked in a pilot experiment with delayed con-
ditioning that rats are, in general, much more sensitive to
sudden noises than continuous ones, and that the click sound
of the electrovalve overshadowed the tone. While in the pi-
lot experiment the subjects waited for the click to lick, and
licked only enough to collect the US, in the experiment with
simultaneous conditioning design they waited for the audi-
tory CS, since they could only predict that the electrovalve
would click during the tone.Qualitative observations showed
that the rats licked also before the click, and that overall they
licked much more than in the pilot experiment. As we will
see below, simultaneous conditioning is as effective as the
delayed one.
• The present design allows one to exclude behavioral
changes due to non-associative factors such as satiation and
fatigue. The subjects had daily access only to a very limited
amount of reinforcer (about 100 drops per session), much
lower than the quantity they can assume in a session of the
same duration when free access is granted (several thousands
of drops, as we checked in a pilot experiment conducted with
a different set of animals).
• We checked explicitly that week-end or bank-holiday
breaks did not have any impact on the subjects’ performance,
nor did variations of the time of the day at which sessions
were executed. In a pilot experiment conducted with other
rats, we checked that inter-session intervals below 40 min-
utes could have an effect on the response, hence the conser-
vative lower bound of 90 minutes.
Also, concerning the animals:
• We found no correlation between the starting or final
age of the subjects and their response. This excludes spu-
rious effects due to the subjects not coming from the same
batch.
• The data of one rat (subject 1-8) were eliminated from
the analysis due to its poor health.
Figures 3 and 4 show the average of the raw (non-
normalized) data for all groups. Notice that we did not sub-
tract the US in the pre-CS, CS, and post-CS trendlines of
control data, since they are equally affected by the uncondi-
tioned response (the US are evenly distributed in the whole
session).
Using Hull model (5) on the raw averaged data, we obtain
the fits (Fig. 3):
Group 1: λ = 540.1 ± 7.1 , αβ = 0.129 ± 0.011 ,
r2 = 0.99 , σ = 55.8 , (7a)
Group 2: λ = 687.6 ± 8.1 , αβ = 0.182 ± 0.017 ,
r2 = 0.99 , σ = 68.0 , (7b)
where r2 is the coefficient of determination and σ is the esti-
mated standard deviation of the fit.
At this point, we would like to comment on the fact that
the raw average presented in Fig. 3 hides a caveat. Assuming
Hull model for the time being, each subject has a particu-
lar asymptote λ and a learning rate αβ, with great variability
among different rats. Therefore, one might doubt about the
legitimacy of averaging the data without taking these differ-
ences into account. This point was discussed in the early
literature and especially acknowledged by Sidman (1952),
after which it has gone almost forgotten (but see Gallistel,
2012; Gallistel et al., 2004) because, after all, average data
do turn out to be useful in a number of experimental situa-
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Figure 3. Average of raw (non-normalized) data, for Group 1 (top left) and 2 (top right), together with the best fit with Hull
model for Group 1 (bottom left) and 2 (bottom right). Sessions are on the horizontal axis, number of licks on the vertical axis.
Light gray, dark gray, and black data points (connected by lines of the same colors) are the licks in the 10 s respectively before,
during, and after the CS. The number of US has been subtracted from the during-CS licks of each individual before taking the
average, and the upper and lower error bars at the 68% confidence level of CS and post-CS data are shown.
tions. Nevertheless, we tackle the issue explicitly again, with
some elementary but not-often-used techniques.
Let us then normalize the data before averaging. We do
so with two independent methods that will yield the same
result. The first method (“averaging procedure”) is model-
independent but assumes that there exists an asymptote of
learning. To determine it, we remove the first and last 15 to
20 data points and make a linear regression of the remainder.
As a general observation, the transient acquisition phase oc-
cupied the first 15 to 20 sessions, while in some cases the last
10 sessions were not as stable as intermediate ones. Thus, we
took different intervals: sessions 16-90, 16-80, 16-70, 21-90,
21-80, and 21-70. The chosen interval is bases on a quali-
tative observation of the data and we selected the one giving
the line with slope closest to zero within one standard devi-
ation. Once selected the session range, we took the average
of the data (linear regression with zero slope). The result is
reported in Tab. 1.
The second method (“best-fit procedure”) consists in as-
suming Hull model and use it to fit the individual data. For
each subjects, a nonlinear regression yields an estimate for
λ (Tab. 1) and αβ. As one can see, the values of λ obtained
by both methods are very similar (the estimated standard de-
viation of the fits ranges from 80 to 240 licks, much larger
than the difference |λaverage − λbest fit|) and, in fact, they have a
linear correlation with r2 ≈ 0.98 both in Group 1 and Group
2 (Fig. 1 of Supplemental Material). Therefore, the deter-
mination of λ for each subject is quite robust and one can
choose either method. In what follows, we take the values
obtained by the nonlinear fit (last row of Tab. 1). Note that
the value of the average λ for each Group is close to the one
obtained from the best fit of the raw average data via Hull
model, Eq. (7), but the associated standard deviation is much
larger. Group 1: 〈λaverage〉 = 542±209, 〈λbest fit〉 = 554±222;
Group 2: 〈λaverage〉 = 687 ± 337, 〈λbest fit〉 = 727 ± 369. This
error is a measure of the dispersion of the λ estimates around
the average within each group, while the estimated standard
deviation σ in Eq. (7) is the mean dispersion of the data with
respect to the theoretical curve.
Having thus determined the asymptote of learning for
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1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8
λaverage 332 488 860 426 856 493 336
λbest fit 299 565 869 425 889 503 331
(αβ)best fit 0.26 ± 0.16 0.05 ± 0.01 0.11 ± 0.02 0.67 ± 0.38 0.09 ± 0.01 0.09 ± 0.02 0.21 ± 0.09
2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8
λaverage 361 599 769 762 225 546 1417 815
λbest fit 362 604 775 778 234 682 1553 827
(αβ)best fit 0.22 ± 0.07 0.16 ± 0.06 0.27 ± 0.07 0.30 ± 0.07 0.74 ± 0.47 0.03 ± 0.01 0.06 ± 0.00 0.23 ± 0.03
Table 1
Asymptote λ (average number of licks during the CS minus number of US, after acquisition) determined by the averaging and
best-fit procedures described in the text for session-by-session data. The association rate αβ obtained by the best fit is also
shown.
Figure 4. Average of raw (non-normalized) data, for Group
1C (top) and 2C (bottom). Sessions are on the horizontal
axis, number of licks on the vertical axis. Light-gray, dark-
gray, and black data are, respectively, pre-CS, CS, and post-
CS licks, withoutUS subtraction. As an added elaboration of
the data, we also show the sum of pre-CS, CS, and post-CS
licks (blue trendline; darkest gray in B/W rendering), where
the number of US has been subtracted from the total licks of
each individual before taking the average, and the upper and
lower error bars at the 68% confidence level of CS and post-
CS data are shown. The dashed line is the regression line of
the “summed” data.
each subject, we normalized the data by dividing the num-
ber of licks by the estimate of λ.The average of normalized
data is shown in Fig. 5. In comparison to Fig. 3, we do not
notice any qualitative change in the experimental trendline.
However, error bars are considerably smaller. Also, while the
estimated standard deviation σ of the best fit of raw data was
greater in Group 2 (Eq. (7)), after normalization it is smaller:
σ = 0.13 for Group 1 and σ = 0.11 for Group 2.
The plots showing the data and Hull’s best fit of v/λ
for representative subjects in the experimental groups are in
Figs. 6 and 7; the figures for all the experimental and con-
trol subjects can be found in Figs. 2–7 in the Supplemental
Material. The advantage of these plots with respect to non-
normalized data (not shown) is that one can directly compare
the fluctuations in response of different individuals.
The averaged data of the two sessions of extinction are
shown in Fig. 8 for the experimental groups (see Fig. 8 in the
Supplemental Material for controls).
Now we are in a position to comment on the results. First
of all, both the pre-CS and post-CS response in the experi-
mental groups were much smaller than the response during
the CS, respectively by a factor of 10 and of 2. At the 68%
confidence level, none of the curves overlap. This means
that the subjects clearly discriminated between the possibil-
ity to obtain the US during the tone and in its absence. The
higher post-CS response with respect to the pre-CS is easily
explained on the grounds of a natural inertia in licking that
extended for a few seconds after the tone was switched off.
This interpretation is confirmed by calculating Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient for CS and post-CS licks (non-subtracted
and non-normalized data) of individual subjects, which is
|r| > 0.45 except in two cases (1-6 and 2-7).2 The corre-
2This relatively high correlation might suggest that a better in-
dicator than (6), stripped of micro-motivational or attentional fluc-
tuations, could be obtained if we subtract the number of post-CS
licks instead of the number of US. However, as we noted before, we
verified that the results of this section do not change.
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Figure 5. Average of normalized data for Group 1 (top left) and 2 (top right), together with the best fit with Hull model
(bottom). Sessions are on the horizontal axis, number of licks on the vertical axis. Light gray, dark gray, and black data points
(connected by lines of the same colors) are the licks in the 10 s respectively before, during, and after the CS. The number of
US has been subtracted from the during-CS licks of each individual before taking the average, and the upper and lower error
bars at the 68% confidence level of CS and post-CS data are shown.
lation between CS and pre-CS licks is smaller, |r| < 0.38.
On the other hand, the control subjects displayed about the
same response level before, during, and after the CS, indi-
cating that there was no discrimination and no acquisition of
association between the CS and the US.3 Moreover, the av-
erage asymptotes of learning of Groups 1 and 2 reported in
Eq. (7) before normalizing the data are significantly different:
the rats did respond differentially to 0.1% and 0.2% concen-
trations. Finally, the data of extinction show a very quick
3The total response of control subjects in Group 1C was flat
throughout the experiment: a linear fit of the total licks yields a
slope −0.23 ± 0.24 and a correlation r2 = 0.01. We did register a
slight positive trend in Group 2C: a linear fit of the total licks yields
a slope 1.43±0.31 and a correlation r2 = 0.20. This trend was driven
by subjects 2C-2, 2C-5, and 2C-8. Possibly, this means that subjects
developed a liking (unrelated to any CS-US associative process) for
the saccharin solution at 0.2% more pronounced that for the less
concentrated solution.
decrease in response of experimental subjects, likely due to
overtraining (Finger, 1942). The flat response of control sub-
jects during the CS reflects the absence of association. Also,
control subjects showed extinction to the whole “apparatus
+ tone + electrovalve click” stimulus (light gray trendlines).
Overall, these results indicate that simultaneous conditioning
was effective and they validate the experimental design.
Other possible effects of overtraining can be looked for in
the long-term trend of post-CS data. A linear regression of
post-CS normalized data of Group 1 yields a slightly nega-
tive slope −0.0010± 0.0002 and an intercept 0.41± 0.01 (the
post-CS response is approximately 40% the response during
the CS), while for Group 2 the slope is −0.0006±0.0002 and
the intercept 0.40±0.01. In both cases, the “inertia” after the
tone tends to decrease, but at a low rate.
A last type of analysis tackles a subtle point about averag-
ing, which we cover for the sake of rigorousness. It plays no
part in the rest of the discussion and the uninterested reader
may skip this paragraph. We have seen that averaging of nor-
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Figure 6. Individual normalized data of Group 1 without
(top) and with the best Hull-model fit (bottom): licks before
(light gray trend), during (black trend) and after (dark gray
trend) the CS, divided by the best-fit λ. The number of US
has been subtracted to the licks during the CS. Sessions are
on the horizontal axis.
malized data is not very different from averaging of raw data,
apart from a decrease of error bars. However, one might still
question the validity of the normalized averaging in the ac-
quisition phase, due to the fact that the acquisition rate αβ can
be very different from subject to subject (Tab. 1). Some rats
reached the asymptote of learning very quickly, while others
did so only towards the end of the experiment. Therefore,
averaging over raw or normalized data does not take into ac-
count variability in the acquisition rate. To check whether
this introduces unwanted artifacts, we can rescale the “time”
of each rat to normalize also the acquisition rate αβ. To illus-
trate the point, assume that Hull model (4) holds and consider
two subjects with learning curve v1(t) = λ1[1− exp(−α1β1t)]
and v2(t) = λ2[1 − exp(−α2β2t)]. Normalizing the asymptote
yields two curves v1(t)λ1 = 1 − exp(−α1β1t) and v2(t)/λ2 =
1 − exp(−α2β2t) that differ only in the learning rate. Call-
ing t˜1 := α1β1t and t˜2 := α2β2t, one ends up with a sin-
gle profile w(t˜) = 1 − exp(−t˜) evaluated at two different
“times” t˜1 and t˜2. Doing this for all subjects, we obtained
the cloud of points shown in Fig. 9 in the Supplemental Ma-
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Figure 7. Individual normalized data of Group 2 without
(top) and with the best Hull-model fit (bottom): licks before
(light gray trend), during (black trend) and after (dark gray
trend) the CS, divided by the best-fit λ. The number of US
has been subtracted to the licks during the CS. Sessions are
on the horizontal axis.
terial. Since we used Hull model on individual data sets to
normalize the asymptote and the learning rate, it should come
as no surprise that this cloud of points is fit by Hull model
with good accuracy, albeit data are rather dispersed (Group
1: λ = 1.00 ± 0.02, αβ = 1.00 ± 0.10, r2 = 0.88, σ = 0.34;
Group 2: λ = 1.00 ± 0.01, αβ = 1.00 ± 0.07, r2 = 0.92,
σ = 0.27).
Let us now turn to individual response differences. With-
out the pretense of being exhaustive, we registered the fol-
lowing two pairs of patterns:
• Wildly fluctuating response (e.g., subjects 1-1, 1-4, 1-7,
2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 2-6, 1C-1, 1C-3, 1C-6, 2C-1, 2C-4). For ex-
perimental subjects, the shape of the learning curve is almost
completely lost into noise.
• Less fluctuating response (e.g., subjects 1-2, 1-3, 1-5,
1-6, 2-3, 2-4, 2-7, 2-8, 1C-2, 1C-4, 1C-7, 1C-8, 2C-2, 2C-
3), where strong fluctuations are less frequent. Experimental
subjects follow more clearly the learning curve.
The difference between “wild” and “mild” fluctuations can
be quantified by considering the estimated standard deviation
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Figure 8. Average of raw (non-normalized) data of the two extinction sessions for experimental groups. Trials are on the
horizontal axis and licks are on the vertical axis.
1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8
0.59 0.29 0.19 0.33 0.16 0.24 0.43
2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8
0.32 0.40 0.22 0.20 0.36 0.30 0.10 0.15
Table 2
Estimated standard deviation σ of the Hull-model best fit of
normalized session-by-session data.
of data with respect to the nonlinear fit with Hull’s learning
curve (Tab. 2). We took as a criterion for “wild fluctuations”
variations greater than or equal to 30% of the peak response
(σ > 0.30). This criterion is arbitrary (one could have taken,
e.g., σ = 0.50 as a threshold) but illustrates the point. Some
subjects are somewhat in between these two categories, since
they showed a stable response during a long time followed by
wildly fluctuating periods.
For those subjects that showed a trend in their response,
we can further recognize:
• Slow increase in response (e.g., subjects 1-2, 2-7, 1C-6,
2C-2, 2C-5, 2C-8). For experimental subjects, this is simply
due to a slow learning rate, while the interpretation for con-
trol subjects is less obvious. Perhaps the unpredictability of
the US was a factor increasing the response, as observed also
by Kaye and Pearce (1984).
• Slow decrease in response (e.g., subjects 1-1, 1-7, 1C-1,
1C-7, 2C-7). This phenomenon is related to the presentation
of the stimuli and their mutual association. This is not short-
term habituation, which is a non-associative process occur-
ring relatively quickly (only a few sessions) (Çevik, 2014;
Thompson, 2009). Moreover, short-term habituation is faster
for weaker stimuli, which we did not see here. However, it is
not long-term habituation either, which also occurs in a rela-
tively short time span (a few sessions, although it depends on
the experiment and the subject species) before any plateau in
the response (Ornitz and Guthrie, 1989; Packer and Siddle,
1987; Plaud et al., 1997). Here one might rather talk about
a very long-term habituation, occurring because animals are
presented with the same stimulus in all trials of all sessions.
In the next sections, we will make a more in-depth analysis
of the individuals’ data.
Discussion
Summarizing the conclusions obtained from the above re-
sults:
• The experimental design has been validated as a viable
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tool of generation and control of Pavlovian conditioning.4
The subjects discriminated between the different chances of
getting the US during the tone CS (simultaneous condition-
ing) with respect to when the tone was absent. The response
was much higher during the CS than before or after. The
definitory criterion for successful discrimination is the ratio
between pre-CS and CS licking. Post-CS response, seldom
discussed in the literature, was much larger than pre-CS re-
sponse due to a natural inertia in the licking behavior but,
still, it was much smaller than the response during the CS.
• While taking the average of raw data is useful for
between-groups comparisons (absolute value of the asymp-
totes), error bars are reduced when considering the average
of data with normalized asymptote of learning. Normaliz-
ing also the learning rate of individuals does not add much
information and is a strongly model-dependent procedure.
• Although we did observe long-range (i.e, spanning sev-
eral sessions) fluctuations in the average subjects response,
the error bars due to individual differences are large enough
to conclude that these fluctuations are not significant. Hull
model (5) is a good description of the average learning curve
in Pavlovian conditioning.
• The main average effects of overtraining are an ex-
tremely slow decrease of the post-CS response and a fast
extinction. Fast extinction points out that the response of
the animals during the experiment was not driven by habit,
contrary to what one might expect in long training histories
(Gür et al., 2018).
We can compare our findings with those in the literature of
post-peak depression or inhibition by reinforcement cited in
the Introduction. In general, our subjects reached the asymp-
tote of learning after 15 to 20 sessions. While gradients in
response have been registered on as short a scale as trial-by-
4It is inevitable that the procurement of saccharin in the present
preparation implies licking at the bottle spout, thus establishing an
operant contingency between licking and obtaining the reinforcer.
Furthermore, given that the US occurred at random times within
the CS, this is an ideal condition for the maintenance of supersti-
tious licking. Despite this being correct (Killeen and Pellón, 2013;
Pellón et al., 2018; Pellón and Killeen, 2015), lick suppression has
been accepted as Pavlovian under an experimental paradigm simi-
lar to the current one, when the consequence is aversive or has been
devalued (e.g., Jozefowiez et al., 2011). By analogy, lick enhance-
ment might have those same characteristics as the reduction of the
response, not to mention that after extended training it has been gen-
erally accepted that behavior shifts control from the consequence to
the antecedent stimulus (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002), a case in
which the results that will be modeled here might fall. Addition-
ally, even if we accept that licking in the present experiment has
an operant contribution to its installment, which is true, we believe
that the theoretical analysis applied in the present paper is not re-
ally affected if an event stimulus is replaced by a response (see also
section General conclusions).
trial or session-by-session intervals, large-scale (i.e., span-
ning many sessions) fluctuations characterized all the plateau
after acquisition. In some cases, we did see a response de-
crease, but much later than acquisition. Even granting that
aversive conditioning may be faster than appetitive one, this
leads us to believe that this decrease is a long-range phe-
nomenon different from the post-peak depression observed
in experiments employing only a few hundred CS-US pair-
ings, in contrast with our almost four thousand trials each
with an average of two CS-US pairings. The latter could be
a transient phenomenon corresponding to the first fluctuation
peak just after acquisition, when present. Such interpretation
is corroborated by past evidence on the non-robustness of
inhibition by reinforcement when extending the duration of
the experiment (Dukhayyil and Lyons, 1973).
In general, observations of individual differences were not
accompanied by attempts to explain them quantitatively (see,
however, Urcelay et al., 2012). In the following sections
we want to do just that. It should be made absolutely clear
that the fact that Hull model is a good fit of data does not
mean that individual differences and response fluctuations
are mere statistical phenomena to be treated as unwanted er-
rors. Different subjects do respond very differently to stimuli
and their response does change erratically trial after trial and
session after session. The issue then is whether we can find
a theoretically motivated model (not just an ad hoc fitting
curve, which is not hard to concoct) better than Hull model
in explaining the data, in particular, the long-range response
decrease observed in some subjects (not to be confused with
the post-peak depression effect in the literature, as already
said above).
DYNAMICAL MODELS OF INDIVIDUAL
BEHAVIOR
Motivation: least-action principle and fine tuning
The simplicity of Hull model makes it the ideal example
where to introduce all the main ingredients of a dynamical
reinterpretation of Pavlovian conditioning processes. By dy-
namical, we mean a very precise concept, superior to any
casual use of the term in the loose sense of “evolving” or
“interacting”. Namely, we postulate that any conditioning
process can be described by a quantity called action and that
the change of the association strength during conditioning
happens in such a way that the action is minimized. Let us
introduce the rationale behind this view.
As a global, externally observable phenomenon, Pavlo-
vian learning has been described through models such as
Rescorla–Wagner’s (1972) and others (Le Pelley, 2004;
Mackintosh, 1975b; Pearce and Hall, 1980; Wagner, 1981;
Wagner & Vogel, 2009). In general, the essence underly-
ing these models appeals to psychological aspects such as
the surprisingness or novelty or predictiveness of the stimuli.
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However, it is not unreasonable to believe that an alterna-
tive conceptualization is possible where, despite behavioral
errors by the subject, the learning process is a naturally ef-
ficient one and, so to speak, minimizes the biological adap-
tation effort. At a biological level, learning can be viewed
as a sequence of events modifying some of the synaptic con-
nections of the brain. This modification does not happen in
a disordered way since, as associative models already high-
lighted, there exist laws (learning curves) applicable to sta-
tistically significant samples. Going a bit beyond the macro-
scopic view of traditional associative models, but without
attempting a microscopic quantitative description of neural
plasticity, we postulate that the brain mechanics of a subject
change through learning from an initial state A to a final state
B efficiently. Operationally, a most effective way to describe
this minimization of effort is through the action. If we de-
pict the learning process in time t as a path from A to B in
an abstract space parametrized by the association strength
v, the profile v(t) describing the evolution in the association
strength minimizes the path from point v(tA) to point v(tB).
A similar statement could be made about the energy spent
in changing the internal state, but both are described by the
same quantity, the action. The action S is a function of the
association strength v and it is minimized when its variation
with respect to v is zero:5
δS
δv
= 0 . (8)
This is the principle of least action. It has been applied suc-
cessfully in physics and our aim now is to use it also in psy-
chology. From physics we will get guidance about what
S is and this guidance will prove itself correct because it
will immediately recover not only Hull’s, but also Rescorla–
Wagner’s model as special cases.
The main idea is to reinterpret the learning curve of any
associative model as the trajectory of one or more small balls
(pointwise particles) rolling up and down a hill (a potential).
The way a particle moves along its potential is called dynam-
ics. In the case of the Hull model, there is only one particle
whose trajectory is shown in Fig. 1 and whose potentialU(v)
is depicted in Fig. 9 (top). The proof of this statement is given
in Appendix A, while the dynamics corresponding to multi-
cue or variable-salience conditioning models is discussed in
Appendix B. In excitatory conditioning with just one cue,
the particle rolls down the slope from the point v = 0 to the
bottom at v = λ, where it unnaturally stops.
At this point, one appreciates the first major advantage of
the least-action principle. If the latter is true, then it is very
hard to understand why a particle placed on the slope of the
potential well would roll down and stop exactly at its bottom.
5At the maxima and minima of a function, its first derivative
vanishes.
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Figure 9. Top: the potential U(v) of Hull’s model (24) for
λ = 1 and αβ = 1. Compare with the solution (3) in Fig. 1.
Bottom: the potential U(v) of the dynamical model (29) for
λ = 1 and (αβ)2 + µ2 = 1. Compare with the solution (9) in
Fig. 10. In both cases, the particle rolling down the potential
represents the change in the associative strength. The direc-
tion of “motion” in excitatory conditioning is represented by
a gray arrow.
The least-action principle tells us that we must fine tune the
initial conditions (position and velocity) of the particle to in-
finite precision in order to achieve such a behavior. If some
latitude in the choice of initial conditions is allowed (as it
should in a natural biological setting), then in general the
particle will oscillate up and down the well until reaching a
final stop at the bottom, as shown in the bottom plot of Fig.
9.
We decided to use tools borrowed from physics because,
in the long run, they carry two major advantages. First, as
said above, they allow one to modify Pavlovian models in a
natural way that would result rather obscure in the traditional
approach, and that can be contrasted with experiments. Sec-
ond, they are the basis from which we will construct a pre-
dictive theory of individual short-scale response variability,
presented in section Quantum Hull model. Ultimately, re-
visiting conditioning models as dynamical models amounts
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Figure 10. The learning curve (9) (solid) with periodic oscil-
lations with µ = 2 and A = 0, compared with Hull’s learning
curve (4) (dashed). Here λ = 1 = αβ.
to a new paradigm of doing model-building in psychology,
where qualitative reasonings leading to quantitative formulæ
are replaced by a rigorous sequence of logical steps. As in
any model building, arbitrariness is not removed, but it will
be pinpointed and put under a higher degree of control.
Theory
The catchword is “unnatural.” The way the particle moves
along its potential in the case of the Hull model is very spe-
cial because it reduces to the simple equation (2). When it
rolls down the slope, the particle experiences some resistance
(friction) from the floor, but not so much as to brake com-
pletely. This happens, by sheer coincidence, exactly at the
bottom of the slope. In a more general situation, we would
expect the particle to oscillate up and down the bottom, if the
friction is moderate, until it reaches a complete stop (Fig. 9,
bottom). If we abandon the rigid setting of Hull’s dynamics
and allow for such a scenario, much more natural from a dy-
namical point of view, we obtain a different trajectory, i.e., a
different learning curve (Appendix A):
v(t) = λ
[
1 − e−αβt(cosµt + A sin µt)
]
, (9)
where µ and A are constants. When µ = 0, this reduces to
Hull model (4) of excitatory conditioning. When µ , 0,
learning is subject to a friction force with progressively
damped oscillations around zero. The learning curve is mod-
ified as in Fig. 10. This profile features oscillations of fixed
frequency µ and decreasing amplitude above and below the
asymptote, which we can look for in data. In particular, it
predicts a first response peak above the subsequent asymp-
tote.
Notice that v(t) is not positive definite at small times un-
less A is sufficiently small. To avoid this problem and to
remove a free parameter from the model, we will pay special
attention to the case A = 0. Data will show that the A , 0 is
disfavored anyway.
Reverting back to discrete time, we can recast Eq. (30) as
a law for the association strength vn at the beginning of trial
(or session) n. The first and second-order derivatives v˙ and
v¨ correspond, respectively, to the forward finite differences
vn − vn−1 and vn+1−2vn+ vn−1, so that the analogue of Eq. (1)
is
vn+1 − (1 − 2αβ)(2vn − vn−1) = (α2β2 + µ2)(λ − vn−1) . (10)
Unless µ = 0, it is not possible to write a simple incremental
law as Hull’s, and the association strength at the beginning
of trial n + 1 is predicted by that of the previous two trials n
and n − 1, instead of just the one immediately preceding as
in Hull model (1).
Data analysis: comparison with Hull model
In order to assess the goodness of fit of the dynamical pro-
posal with respect to the traditional Hull model, we should
take into account that the first has more free parameter than
Hull’s. Having more parameters clearly gives an intrinsic
flexibility in data fitting that more rigid theories do not have,
and one should balance this factor against the actual capabili-
ties of the new models to accommodate observations. This is
the typical situation where comparative statistics such as the
Bayesian (or Schwarz) Information Criterion (BIC) and the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) can be extremely useful,
as advocated by Witnauer et al. (2017).
Let σ2e :=
∑N
n=1[yn − f (tn)]2/N be the error variance of
the fit, the averaged sum of squared residuals (also known as
residual sum of squares or sum of squared errors), where N
is the number of data, yn is the experimental datum at the n-
th session and f (tn) is the value predicted by the theoretical
model. (The error variance σ2e is not the estimated variance
σ2 of the fits discussed above. They are related to each other
by σ=e Nσ
2/(N− p), where p is the number of free parameters
of the function f .) The BIC is defined as (Schwarz, 1978)
BIC := N lnσ2e + p lnN , (11)
while the AIC is (Akaike, 1974)
AIC := N lnσ2e + 2p . (12)
The first term in Eqs. (11) and (12) quantifies the badness of
the fit (the greater the error variance, the worse the fit), while
the second term increase linearly with p. The BIC and AIC
penalize model complexity slightly differently. For each the-
oretical model, one can compute the BIC and the AIC: the
model with smaller criteria is to be preferred. Calling the
difference ∆ := |(IC model 1) − (IC model 2)| for the Bayes
or Akaike IC, one finds weak evidence if ∆ < 2, positive
evidence if 2 6 ∆ < 6, strong evidence if 6 6 ∆ < 10,
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and very strong evidence if ∆ > 10 (Jeffreys, 1961; Kass and
Raftery, 1995). We will use the term “moderate” to indicate
cases where evidence is positive in one criterion but weak in
the other.
While Hull model has two free parameters (λ and αβ),
the oscillatory model (9) has four (λ, αβ, µ, and A). Setting
A = 0, we are left with three free parameters, which can
give more flexibility with respect to Hull model but are more
penalized in the InformationCriteria when fitting session-by-
session individual data (Tab. 3).
We can divide the subjects in three groups: those for
which the Hull model is clearly favoured, those for which the
A = 0 oscillatory model is clearly favored, and those where
the Hull and oscillatory models are about equally favored by
the Information Criteria.
• As one can see from the table, Hull best fit is favored for
subjects 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 2-2, 2-6, and 2-7 (weak
to positive evidence, 1 6 ∆ 6 5). However, here we are
not comparing two independent models but a model and its
extension by one (µ) or two (µ, A) extra parameters. There-
fore, we have to interpret with care the meaning of the cases
where Hull is favored. For subjects 1-1, 1-2, 1-5, 2-2, and
2-7, the estimated µ in the oscillatory best fit is compatible
with zero (1-1: µ = −0.13 ± 0.17; 1-2: µ = 10−11 ± 107,
1-5: µ = 6 ± 105; 2-2: µ = 10−6 ± 104; 2-7: µ = 10−4 ± 6).
Therefore, there is no statistically significant smooth oscilla-
tion of the type (9) in their response. For subject 1-4 (weak
evidence in favor of Hull according to the AIC, ∆ = 1), µ
is nonzero at the 68% confidence level but zero at the 99%
confidence level (µ = 0.45 ± 0.21). In the case of subjects
1-3 and 1-6, µ is significantly nonzero at the 99% confi-
dence level but is very high (1-3: µ = 12.61 ± 0.04; 1-6:
µ = 6.23 ± 0.02), meaning that data are fitted with densely
packed oscillations. We regard this as an artifact and thus dis-
card these oscillatory fits as unviable and consider the µ = 0
case as the best fit. Finally, in the case of subject 2-6 µ is
significantly nonzero at the 99% confidence level and is not
high (µ = 0.04 ± 0.01), but the BIC and AIC are larger than
for the Hull model. From this discussion, we conclude that,
of these nine cases, only one (subject 2-6) sees Hull model as
the favorite when considered as independent of (alternative
to, opponent of) the oscillatory model, although evidence is
just positive according to the BIC (∆ = 3) and weak accord-
ing to the AIC (∆ = 1). While in all the other cases Hull’s
primacy should be regarded simply as the fact that, for these
subjects, the parameter µ is close to zero.
• The data of subjects 1-7, 2-3, 2-4, and 2-8 favor the
A = 0 oscillatory model with, respectively, very strong, mod-
erate, strong, and moderate evidence. Restoring A as a free
parameters, we get an even better fit for subject 1-7.
• The case of subjects 2-1 and 2-5 is less clear-cut: the
A = 0 oscillatory model (2-1: µ = 0.17 ± 0.03; 2-5:
0.56 ± 0.04) is slightly more favored than Hull model in the
AIC, while the A , 0 model is worse than the A = 0 one in
both the BIC and the AIC. Since the difference is about 1%
of the value of the criteria and evidence in favor or against is
weak (∆ = 1), we cannot decide whether µ = 0 or µ , 0 for
these subjects.
The best-fit parameter values of subjects 1-7, 2-3, 2-4, and
2-8 for the three models are given in Tab. 4 and the best-fit
curves are shown in Fig. 11. Since the favored best fits with
A , 0 are not particularly strong (the parameter A is always
zero at the 95% confidence level), we can conclude that the
model with A = 0 is sufficient to explain the data of these
subjects deviating from Hull’s behavioral trend.
Discussion
Overall, the Hull model is favored (but only moderately)
for only one out of the 15 experimental subjects, the oscil-
latory model with A = 0 and µ , 0 is strongly favored in
two subjects and moderately favored in two more, the oscil-
latory model with A = 0 and µ = 0 is a good fit of eight
more subjects (and it coincides with Hull model), and there
is no preference for either model in two more subjects. The
fact that the Hull model is favored (and moderately so) only
in 7% of the experimental subjects justifies the present and
future interest in the A = 0, µ , 0 oscillatory model (9).
The conclusion is that, if we insist in considering Hull
model as the correct description of the learning curves, then
we can explain at most 73% of the data (1+8+2 = 11 subjects
out of 15), while if we postulate the least-action principle we
obtain a model that includes Hull as a special case and can
explain 93 − 100% of the data. Therefore, this extension of
Hull model is both natural and viable.
COLORED STOCHASTIC MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL
BEHAVIOR
Motivation and spectral analysis
The first aspect drawing one’s attention to the individ-
uals’ data is the generalized presence of large fluctuations
in the response, translating into an unstable inter-trial and
inter-session associative strength. These fluctuations are
present even in those very few subjects with relatively small
inter-session variability, such as 2-7. Since there seems to
be no qualitative change with the time scale (trial-by-trial
compared with session-by-session; see Fig. 12), fluctuations
might be assumed to plague the performance of the subjects
at any scale. This means that it is quite natural to regard these
data as a time series described by a nowhere-differentiable
pattern instead of a smooth learning curve. This is the moti-
vation to replace (1) with an evolution equation for the asso-
ciative strength encoding a stochastic component.
The mathematics of stochastic processes is not a new tool
in learning theories. In fact, the earliest conditioning mod-
els had an inherent element of randomness in their predic-
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BIC, AICց 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8
Hull 171, 163 43, 36 −32, −40 68, 60 −62, −69 13, 5 116, 108 –
oscillations (A = 0) 175, 165 48, 38 −28, −38 71, 61 −57, −67 16, 6 104, 94 –
oscillations (A , 0) 179, 166 52, 40 −25, −38 75, 62 −55, −68 18, 5 91, 78 –
fractional 175, 165 80, 70 −28, −38 62, 52 −44, −54 41, 31 123, 113 –
BIC, AICց 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8
Hull 64, 56 103, 95 −3, −10 −27, −35 84, 76 49, 41 −139, −147 −75, −82
oscillations (A = 0) 65, 55 107, 97 −4, −14 −33, −43 85, 75 52, 42 −135, −145 −76, −86
oscillations (A , 0) 69, 57 112, 99 −1, −13 −31, −43 91, 79 57, 45 −130, −143 −72, −84
fractional 68, 58 110, 100 5, −5 −16, −26 88, 78 52, 42 −64, −74 −70, −80
Table 3
BIC and AIC (approximated to zero decimals) of the best fits of session-by-session data with Hull model (4), the oscillatory
model (9) with A = 0, the oscillatory model with A , 0 (shown only for subjects significantly deviating from Hull’s learning
curve), and the fractional model (54) described in Appendix C. Favored models are in boldface, except the fractional model
for subject 1-4 because it is a false positive.
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Figure 11. Best-fit of normalized data with Hull model (4) (dashed curve) and the oscillatory model (9) with A = 0 with the
parameter values of Tab. 4. Sessions are on the horizontal axis and normalized response is on the vertical axis.
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Subject Parameters Hull Oscillations (A = 0) Oscillations (A , 0)
1-7
λ 1 0.97 ± 0.04 0.78 ± 0.13
αβ 0.21 ± 0.09 0.04 ± 0.01 0.04 ± 0.01
µ 0 0.12 ± 0.01 0.05 ± 0.02
A 0 0 −2.46 ± 1.94
σ 0.43 0.40 0.36
2-3
λ 1 0.99 ± 0.02 0.99 ± 0.02
αβ 0.27 ± 0.07 0.15 ± 0.05 0.19 ± 0.08
µ 0 0.19 ± 0.04 0.30 ± 0.07
A 0 0 0.63 ± 0.55
σ 0.22 0.22 0.22
2-4
λ 1 0.98 ± 0.02 0.99 ± 0.02
αβ 0.30 ± 0.07 0.14 ± 0.03 0.27 ± 0.11
µ 0 0.22 ± 0.03 0.38 ± 0.07
A 0 0 1.04 ± 0.59
σ 0.20 0.18 0.18
2-8
λ 1 0.98 ± 0.02 0.98 ± 0.02
αβ 0.23 ± 0.03 0.13 ± 0.02 0.13 ± 0.03
µ 0 0.15 ± 0.02 0.15 ± 0.05
A 0 0 0.02 ± 0.46
σ 0.15 0.15 0.15
Table 4
Best-fit values of the parameters of Hull model (4) and the oscillatory model (9) with A = 0 and A , 0 for those subjects
whose data (normalized with respect to Hull’s asymptote) favor at least one of the oscillatory models for both the BIC and the
AIC. σ is the estimated standard error. The most favored model is in boldface.
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Figure 12. Trial-by-trial data of subject 2-7. The best-fit
values for all subjects are given in Tab. 5. This example,
where we chose the most normative subject at the session-by-
session time scale, shows that data do not become smoother
when changing the scale.
tions. The classic 1950s models were cast in the language
of probability theory and one considered the probability p of
a given conditioned response (CR) as a function of the trial
number n; see, e.g., the works by Estes (Estes, 1950; Estes
and Burke, 1953), Bush and Mosteller (1951a; 1951b; 1953),
and the reviews byMosteller (1958) and Bower (1994). Later
on, the strength of association v was regarded as a better op-
erational variable than the probability p (Rescorla and Wag-
ner, 1972) and the focus was shifted to ideally determinis-
tic predictions. More recently, stochastic processes played
a role in the context of neural networks and their applica-
tion to robotics and artificial intelligence. In particular, a
path integral can describe a learning process of a neural net-
work as a finite-temperature stochastic process (Balakrish-
nan, 2000). Path integrals have also been applied to con-
trol theory and reinforcement learning (Braun et al., 2011;
Farshidian and Buchli, 2013; Kappen, 2007; Pan et al., 2014;
2015; Theodorou, 2011; Theodorou et al., 2010a; 2010b;
2011; van den Broek et al., 2008). In all these cases, the
problem is to minimize the cost of a learning process or of
an action by an agent.
Despite some remote similarities, these approaches differ
from ours, as we will see below. First, however, we have
to introduce some indispensable tools to carry out a spectral
analysis. The latter is an analysis of the frequency modes
constituting the noise in data. If data predominantly oscillate
on a long time scale, then the noise dominates the small fre-
quencies of the spectrum. On the other hand, if oscillations
mainly occur on a very short time scale, then the spectrum is
more noisy at large frequencies. The noise in learning data
corresponds to the second case.
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1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4
λ 8.9 ± 0.2 14.7 ± 0.3 21.8 ± 0.2 11.9 ± 0.1
αβ 0.00832 ± 0.00213 0.00155 ± 0.00015 0.00298 ± 0.00022 0.02458 ± 0.00595
σ 12.1 13.5 12.8 9.1
1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8
λ 22.2 ± 0.3 13.4 ± 0.2 9.7 ± 0.1 –
αβ 0.00273 ± 0.00018 0.00264 ± 0.00025 0.00677 ± 0.00097 –
σ 12.4 10.5 8.1 –
2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4
λ 10.3 ± 0.1 15.7 ± 0.2 19.7 ± 0.3 19.8 ± 0.2
αβ 0.00688 ± 0.00095 0.00696 ± 0.00111 0.00793 ± 0.00115 0.00865 ± 0.00119
σ 8.2 14.3 15.5 14.2
2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8
λ 7.5 ± 0.1 17.0 ± 0.4 36.8 ± 0.3 21.0 ± 0.2
αβ 0.77470 ± 1.21695 0.00103 ± 0.00008 0.00154 ± 0.00006 0.00632 ± 0.00066
σ 6.6 11.8 12.7 13.2
Table 5
Hull-model best-fit parameters of trial-by-trial data. σ is the estimated standard error. There is greater dispersion than in
binned data (session-by-session, Tab. 1).
In essence, the variability of the response of a subject is
encoded in the frequencies ω, distributed in the so-called
power spectral density S (ω), obtained from the response v(t).
If the response is perfectly stable from trial to trial, then all
frequencies are equally represented in S (ω) and the power
spectral density is constant. If the response varies gradually
as in the ideal learning curve of Hull model, then S (ω) is a
smooth function. If, however, the response varies erratically
from trial to trial, as in actual data, then S (ω) becomes very
ragged and this raggedness is what we call noise. The basics
of spectral analysis and theoretical shape of the power spec-
tral density for the Hull model without and with noise are
presented in Appendix D. Here we only note that noise alone
is usually represented by the power spectral density
S a(ω) =
1
ωa
, (13)
where a is a constant. When a = 0, noise is said to be white,
while it is colored if a , 0.
The nature of the noise source in data can be discriminated
by the large-frequency region of the power spectral density.
If all noise comes from statistical error, then this region is flat
in the log-log plane. However, if this region is not flat and
exhibits a positive or negative average slope, then it is possi-
ble that some other random noise-generating mechanism, of
cognitive-behavioral origin, is in action.
Theory
Hull model with colored noise admits a straightforward
mathematical treatment as a stochastic process. Let us go
back to the original equation (1) for the change in associa-
tive strength from one trial to the next: ∆vn = αβ(λ − vn−1),
which we can also write as vn = (1 − αβ)vn−1 + λαβ. Now
we promote vn to a random variable Vn = vn + ξn, where
vn and ξn are, respectively, the deterministic and stochastic
parts. This is tantamount to consider the stochastic version
of the previous equation, with an added random noise source
ηn:
Vn = (1 − αβ)Vn−1 + λαβ + ηn , (14)
where ηn = ξn − (1 − αβ)ξn−1. This is called a first-order au-
toregressive process (ARP) with drift λαβ and colored noise
ηn. When ηn has a normal distribution (white noise) and in
the limit αβ → 0, this reduces to a random walk (Brown-
ian motion). In the case of Pavlovian conditioning, it would
correspond to a baseline random behavior in the presence of
non-salient stimuli.
What is the source of the noise ηn? In our psychological
interpretation of this signal, we can draw inspiration from
the “1/ f noise” cognitive literature, where the variability in
human response in memory tasks, reaction tasks, mental ro-
tation, word naming, and so on, is characterized by a colored
noise (Dixon et al., 2010; 2012; Eke et al., 2002; Farrell et al.,
2006; Gilden, 2001; Gilden et al., 1995; Holden, 2005; 2013;
Holden et al., 2009; 2011; Kello et al., 2007; 2008; Ihlen and
Vereijken, 2010; 2013; Likens et al., 2015; Stephen et al.,
2009a; 2009b; Van Orden et al., 2003; 2005; Thornton and
Gilden, 2005; Wagenmakers et al., 2004; 2005; 2012; see
Calcagni, 2018, for a brief account, and Kello et al., 2010,
and Riley and Holden, 2012, for reviews). There are three
interpretations of this phenomenon. In the so-call idiosyn-
cratic view, this noise is regarded as the intrinsic uncertainty,
possibly due to an internal estimation error, in the formation
of representations in the mind, such as the reproduction of
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spatial or temporal intervals in human memory (Gilden et al.,
1995). Different cognitive systems may have different types
of uncertainty, all combining to accidentally give an overall
noise term which is not a general, fundamental (i.e., endoge-
nous, intrinsic to mind and body) property of human behavior
(Farrell et al., 2006; Wagenmakers et al., 2004; 2005; 2012).
In the nomothetic view, the stochastic component may be
due not to specific cognitive systems, nor to the mere sum
of their noises, but to a more fundamental mechanism such
that cognition would happen as the emergence of patterns
in a self-organizing complex dynamical system (Dixon et al.,
2010; 2012; Gilden, 2001; Gilden et al., 1995; Holden, 2013;
Ihlen and Vereijken, 2010; Riley and Holden, 2012; Stephen
et al., 2009a; 2009b; Van Orden et al., 2003). In particu-
lar, the colored noise would be the collective expression of
the metastable coordination of different cognitive and mo-
tor systems in the performance of a task (Kello et al., 2007).
A third view intermediate between the idiosyncratic and the
nomothetic was also considered (Likens et al., 2015).
Translating these considerations to the realm of non-
human animal behavior, we can entertain the possibility
(Calcagni, 2018) that, if nonwhite noise were detected in ex-
periments of Pavlovian or operant conditioning, one would
be observing a signal coming form the coordination of motor
systems with the internal functioning of the subject’s mind
(either as an averaging of multiple cognitive subsystems or as
an emergent collective manifestation of such coordination).
We will come back to this cognitive perspective after analyz-
ing the data.
Data analysis: comparison with Hull model
Session-by-session data are a coarse-grained version of
the full data set of trial points. Inevitably, this coarse graining
can hide or distort stochastic signals present at all time scales.
For this reason, we consider trial-by-trial data. It is not dif-
ficult to check that a similar analysis done with session-by-
session data yield the same results, but with a much greater
error in the fits.
Table 5 reports the parameters of the Hull model fitting
trial-by-trial data, while Fig. 13 shows the power spectral
density of the signal of some experimental subjects, cal-
culated from each individual set of trial data points. See
Figs. 10 and 11 of the Supplemental Material for the spec-
tra of all experimental subjects. Due to failure of record-
ings, the total number of points of subjects 1-5, 1-6, and 1-
7 is smaller than the maximum 3960: respectively, 3828,
3894, and 3916. This causes no problem since we have
plenty of statistics. The exponential-dominated smooth re-
gion (plateaux near ω = 0) in Fig. D3 is not visible in these
figures because they span a larger frequency range; however,
one can check that the spectra at low frequencies are of the
same form as the simulated white-noise spectrum in Fig. D3.
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Figure 13. Power spectral density of trial-by-trial data of
two representative subjects of Group 1 and Group 2. The on-
set of the spectra on the left agrees with the signal predicted
by Hull model, while the noise band at higher frequencies
extends indefinitely to the right.
We look for a fit of the type of (13) (times a constant
which plays no role here) of the region of the spectral densi-
ties dominated by the stochastic noise, typically for ω > 0.1.
Fitting the power spectra from ω = 0.1 to ω = 30, we get the
results of Tab. 6.6
The parameter a is zero within the experimental uncer-
tainty at the 1σ-level for all subjects except 1-1, 1-3, and 2-
3, where a vanishes at the 2σ-level. In all cases, the best-fit
value of a is very close to zero, at least in one part over one
hundred. Therefore, all subjects of both groups display white
noise.
Note that the spectral analysis of the noise signal occurs
6For the nonlinear fit, we used a sampling of frequencies of
∆ω = 0.001, but we checked that a sampling ten times coarser does
not change the results significantly. Also, if one fits up to a smaller
maximum, e.g., ω = 5 or ω10, one does obtain a nonvanishing a for
several subjects. However, this may be due to considering a region
of frequencies where the negative slope of the background profile
in Fig. D1 still dominates over the noise signal.
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S a(ω) = ω−a 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4
a 0.016 ± 0.011 −0.003 ± 0.010 −0.016 ± 0.014 0.003 ± 0.010
Color white∗ white white∗ white
1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8
a −0.011 ± 0.016 −0.007 ± 0.010 −0.010 ± 0.013 –
Color white white white –
2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4
a 0.010 ± 0.010 −0.001 ± 0.010 0.021 ± 0.012 0.007 ± 0.008
Color white white white∗ white
2-5 2-6 2-7 2-8
a 0.002 ± 0.007 −0.009 ± 0.023 −0.044 ± 0.051 −0.006 ± 0.008
Color white white white white
Table 6
Type of noise in the noise spectrum S a(ω) of individual trial-by-trial data, analyzed between ω = 0.1 and ω = 30. The error
is one standard deviation. Asterisks denote conclusions valid within two standard deviations.
in a frequency region unaffected by whether the background
model is Hull’s or the oscillatory one, Eqs. (4) and (9). The
power spectral density of the latter would only differ in the
position of the right end of the plateau in Fig. D1 and in an
extra bump just at the onset of the slope. When fitting high-
frequency data, these details are subdominant with respect to
the main noise trend and, in fact, they do not appear in Fig.
13.
Discussion
Having checked the presence of white noise in individual
subjects, we turn to the psychological interpretation of these
results. From a strictly behaviorist point of view, the question
of whether this noise comes from a naive sum over differ-
ent cognitive systems or arises as an emergent phenomenon
is immaterial. These data cannot tell us anything about ei-
ther alternative. However, we observe the same noise in all
subjects and this noise is white. The simplest explanation is
that its origin is statistical and implies no fundamental prop-
erty of the “rat mind.” If there were an underlying motor-
cognitive mechanism (naive interference or emergent phe-
nomenon) depending on the individual, on the task, and on
the relevance of the stimuli for the subject and its learning
history, one would see these differences in the noise trend.
Although we cannot exclude this possibility, our data do not
yield support to it. In particular, they exclude the cogni-
tive function of attention as the main responsible for colored
noise. In fact, the main processes involved in this Pavlovian
experiment are motor and attentional, and the only source
of a colored signal could come from attention alone (or its
interference with motor processes; idiosyncratic view) or as
an emergent phenomenon from the combination of attention
and motor processes (nomothetic view). The conclusion is
that higher-order cognitive functions, absent in this experi-
ment but present in those of human response, may be the
main source of colored noise.
Talking about response variability in the learning curve,
Gallistel et al. (2004) conjectured that data of conditioning
experiments might bear a trace of a colored noise. We do
not confirm this conjecture here and, on the other hand, we
also insist on the existence, at a significant confidence level,
of a learning asymptote, which was questioned by the same
authors.
We also stress that the cognitive-noise hypothesis is de-
scriptive but not predictive. To the best of our knowledge,
no explicit model of the “internal working of the mind” pre-
dicting the observed diversity of noise spectra has been pro-
posed. In the section Quantum Hull model, we will advance
a quantitative theory giving this type of prediction.
QUANTUM HULL MODEL
Having described, in section Dynamical models of indi-
vidual behavior, several well-known models of Pavlovian
conditioning in terms of the classical mechanics of pointwise
particles, we make a new step: we quantize them. In physics,
“quantization” is a mathematical procedure that uses a classi-
cal system as the basis to construct a physically different sys-
tem governed by the law of quantum mechanics. These laws
are still governed by the least-action principle, they describe
the behavior of microscopic objects and recover the classical
system in a certain limit. In the present context of behavioral
psychology, we want to quantize the learning system not just
“because we can,” but because we want to check whether
the dynamical paradigm can also explain quantitatively the
response fluctuations observed in experiments.
Thus, a classical pointwise particle moving along a
smooth trajectory x(t) becomes, upon quantization, a wave-
function Ψ(x, t) which indicates the probability to find the
particle at position x at time t. It is not our purpose to intro-
duce the reader to the main notions of quantum mechanics.
22 GIANLUCA CALCAGNI
What matters here is to understand what happens if we quan-
tize conditioning models: do these models predict phenom-
ena in animal behavior not contemplated by standard learn-
ing? The answer is in the affirmative.
In “classical” learning, the response is predicted determin-
istically by the learning curve, so that at time t after the on-
set of training the CS-US association strength will exactly
be v(t); this association strength is then identified with the
amount of response of the subject, for instance, the num-
ber of licks. Experimental uncertainty forbids to take this
picture too literally, and exact predictions must be checked
against data with error bars. However, in “quantum” learn-
ing the prediction itself is not deterministic and we cannot
claim that at time t the subject will respond with strength v.
Instead, we can only give a probability distribution P(v, t)
saying what the chance is that at time t the subject will re-
spond with strength v. This uncertainty is not due to experi-
mental errors and it will be there even in the most unrealistic
case of an error-free observation. In other words, it is in-
trinsic to the behavior of the animal. Whether this feature is
of motor or cognitive origin is a problem one might want to
understand after checking the theory experimentally. What
matters here is that we can predict the exact shape of the
probability distribution P(v, t) if we follow the quantization
procedure so successful in physics. The point-particle trajec-
tory v(t) is replaced by a wave-function Ψ(v, t), solution to
the quantum dynamics, that can spread throughout the whole
domain 0 < v < λ. The probability to have a certain associ-
ation strength v at time t is given by P(v, t) = |Ψ(v, t)|2. The
characteristic of these quantum models of Pavlovian condi-
tioning is that they have no way to maintain perfect condi-
tioning (i.e., v = λ) indefinitely. After some sojourn time
determined by the salience of the stimuli, the subject can ex-
hibit a nonoptimal or even overoptimal association strength
away from perfect conditioning, even if the CS-US pair is
presented in each trial. We will describe these effects with
the simplest available example: the quantum Hull model.
Theory
In the classical Hull model, at time t we can determine
with absolute accuracy the strength v(t) and, from Eq. (2),
the velocity of learning or learning rate v˙(t) = αβ[λ − v(t)].
After quantizing this model with the procedure described in
Appendix E, as a result we can no longer determine v(t) and
v˙(t) with arbitrary accuracy. Curiously, the uncertainty ∆v
on the association strength v is limited by the uncertainty ∆v˙
on the learning rate v˙, in such a way that, in general, if we
measure v with very good accuracy there will be a large un-
certainty on a v˙measurement, and vice versa. In other words,
if we force ∆v to get as close to zero as possible, then ∆v˙ will
increase, and vice versa. This relative minimum uncertainty,
present even in an error-free ideal experiment, is governed
by the relation
∆v∆v˙ >
h¯
2
, (15)
where h¯ is a strictly positive constant, a fundamental param-
eter of the theory. In the classical model, h¯ = 0 and we
can measure v and v˙ with infinite accuracy (in an error-free
experiment) simultaneously.
A priori, the subject has infinitely many ways to reach op-
timal learning v = λ starting from complete ignorance v = 0
at t = 0. While in the classical model there exists only one
single learning curve v(t) connecting the points v(0) = 0 and
v(large t) ≃ λ, in the quantummodel all the possible trajecto-
ries are realized simultaneously and in such a way that they
interfere with one another. The net effect is the uncertainly
relation (15). The interested reader may consult Appendix E
for more details about this perspective, which goes under the
name of path-integral quantization.
The quantum model gives rise to several prediction.
• Prediction 1. The asymptote of learning is not a durable
achievement. There exists an intrinsic source of variability
in the subject response, not due to statistical errors or unpre-
dictability of individual behavioral quirks. Only three situ-
ations as possible: (i) response variability is too slow to be
detected, (ii) it only happens between training sessions, or
(iii) it happens on a trial-by-trial basis.
• Prediction 2. There exists a special quantum state fol-
lowing a Gaussian distribution such that response fluctua-
tions do not decrease in time. Initially, the system evolves
almost classically and one can determine with good accu-
racy the association strength of the subject, but at later trials
there is a nonzero chance that the subject display a nonop-
timal conditioning level, even if the highest probability is at
the asymptotic value v = λ. Quantum fluctuations increase
to indefinitely large values.
• Prediction 3. There exists a quantum state such that re-
sponse fluctuations are large and almost constant throughout
the whole experiment. This state minimizes the uncertainly
principle (15), so that ∆v∆v˙ = h¯/2 at all times. The ampli-
tude δv of quantum fluctuations is of order of the uncertainty
∆v, which in turn is of order of the classical asymptote of
learning:
∆v ∼ δv = O(λ) . (16)
• Prediction 4. The universal constant h¯ can be deter-
mined by experiments and reads
h¯ ≃ 2αβ(∆v)2 . (17)
• Prediction 5. Response variability is described by white
noise.
Again, we refer to Appendix E for a top-down derivation of
these claims. Here we comment on a central aspect relevant
to their empirical check. The first prediction is a consequence
of the inequality (15). At any given time (i.e., trial), the un-
certainty ∆v on the association strength can be interpreted as
BEHAVIOR STABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PAVLOVIAN EXTENDED CONDITIONING 23
the fact that the association between the CS and the US con-
tinuously varies in strength and is subject to what wemay call
quantum fluctuations. After reaching the asymptote at v = λ,
the subject will not keep the maximal response λ because,
due to these quantum fluctuations, the association strength
will be shifted by some amount δv > 0. Therefore, the actual
response at any given time fluctuates as λ ± δv. After some
characteristic sojourn time t∗ since reaching the point v = λ,
the subject shows signs of “unlearning” (if the fluctuation is
negative and λ → λ − δv) or even of “overlearning” (if the
fluctuation is positive and λ→ λ + δv)!
Therefore, at times t > t∗, the subject can display either
of two behaviors: (A) it loses the incentive even if the US is
presented at each subsequent trial and the probability to show
a conditioned response upon presentation of the CS starts to
decrease; or, (B) its response increases beyond the learning
asymptote. Neither situation (A) nor (B) lasts forever be-
cause once the particle rolls down back or across the hill-top
(under- or over-response by the subject), the presentation of
new trials pushes the association strength back to the asymp-
tote. Once reached the asymptote again at a time t1 > t∗, the
subject will stay there for another period of duration ∼ t∗,
after which another fluctuation will happen at a time ∼ t∗ + t1
since the beginning of the experiment. And so on.
What do we expect to observe then? In an ideal exper-
iment of quantum physics, one prepares the particle at the
unstable maximum at time t = 0 and asks what the probabil-
ity is to find the particle at the same state after some time t.
However, pointwise measurements and continuous observa-
tion of unstable systems (Fonda et al., 1978) can give rise to
very different outcomes. Persistence at the maximum can be
extended if the system is measured too often or continuously
(i.e., observed) and not left to evolve naturally a sufficiently
long time (Sudbery, 1984). If one observes the system at a
time t < t∗, most likely one will not detect any change with
respect to the initial state, while at times t > t∗ decay from
the unstable state will be observedmore likely. In the context
of comparative psychology, this distinction is less clear. The
natural time evolution of the system corresponds to unob-
servable cognitive processes taking place in the subject after
training, away from the experimenter and the conditioning
box, while measuring the response of the subject in an ex-
periment yields an empirical estimate of the otherwise unob-
servable associative strength. However, separating the natu-
ral evolution from measurement is a tricky business because
“measuring” also means making the system evolve by train-
ing. One might change interpretation and insist that “natu-
ral evolution” is equivalent to training and a “measurement”
corresponds to testing the result of training at the last trial,
but this distinction would be quite artificial because the mea-
surement procedure does not depend on whether the US is
presented or not. Therefore, each time the subject is trained
the association strength evolves and is measured at the same
time. As a consequence, we can identify three situations, de-
pending on whether t∗ is greater or smaller than the inter-trial
and inter-session intervals.
• (i) t∗ > ∆tsession > ∆ttrial. If t∗ is greater than the du-
ration of a trial ∆ttrial, the phenomenon of sojourn time is
altered, and in fact reset, each time a break in conditioning is
taken. In this case, once the subject reaches the asymptote of
learning we should observe a constant response at v = λ, at
all trials. If t∗ is also greater than the inter-session interval,
then the response is stable both on a trial-by-trial and on a
session-by-session time scale. The learning curve would be
identical to the classical one in both time scales.
• (ii) ∆ttrial < t∗ < ∆tsession. If t∗ were greater than the
trial duration ∆ttrial but smaller than the inter-session inter-
val ∆tsession, then we should observe a change in response
between sessions, rapidly restored to maximal learning after
the first trials of the session. The trial-by-trial learning curve
would then display a long plateau marked by local “pulses”
or fluctuations lasting only the first few trials of each session.
• (iii) t∗ < ∆ttrial. If t∗ is smaller than the duration of
a trial, then we should observed decay, to the left (under-
response) or to the right (over-response), from the learning
asymptote. The overall picture after the acquisition phase
is neither that of a constant, stable maximal response (as in
the classical Hull model or when t > ∆tsession) nor a sudden
decrease or increase in the response some time after reaching
the asymptote (as it would happen in a physics experiments),
nor a sudden decrease or increase of response at the begin-
ning of each session (as when ∆ttrial < t < ∆tsession). Rather,
there would be a never-ending series of trial-by-trial oscilla-
tions above and below the asymptote.
Empirical evidence of predictions
1. Our observations clearly fall into case (iii). Response
variations occur on a trial-by-trial time scale t∗ < ∆ttrial.
2. If the system were described by a Gaussian state, re-
sponse fluctuations should increase in time. This prediction
is not met. If one starts from a nearly classical state with a
spread width b close to zero, late-time fluctuations may be-
come compatible with data, but then early variations of the
response are too small relative to those actually observed.
Roughly speaking, the problem is that, regardless the abso-
lute size of the fluctuations, we did not observe any relative
change in them during the experiment. There are two alter-
native meanings we can attach to this outcome. Either the
Gaussian state is a valid description but b is so small (i.e.,
the initial state is so sharply peaked at the classical solution)
that we cannot see an appreciable spread of the distribution
of the association strength v in the total time scale of the
experiment; or we must exclude the Gaussian state (75) as
a viable initial condition. The second possibility does not
rule out the theory as a whole because one can choose other
states, usually constructed from the non-normalizable energy
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eigenstates of the inverted oscillator (see Barton, 1986). In
general, however, these will not minimize the uncertainty
principle, and they will suffer from the same problem of fast
spreading in time. Due to the quantum uncertainty in the rate
of change of the association strength, the association strength
can acquire different velocities and so get further and further
displaced from the classical value.
3. The prediction (16) is compatible with what we found
in the experiment. Identifying the amplitude of fluctuations
with the estimated standard deviation of the fits with Hull
model,
δv
?
= σ , (18)
we get σ ∼ 0.1 − 0.6λ: the uncertainty of the association
strength is between 10% and 60% the value of the asymp-
tote, depending on the subject, for an average of about one
third of the asymptote. This is true not only for the session-
by-session data (Tab. 2), but also for the trial-by-trial ones
(Tab. 5). Using trial-by-trial data, the average of the variance
σ2 for each group and for all experimental subjects together
is
Group 1: l2 ≃ σ2avg = 129.2 ± 40.5 , (19a)
Group 2: l2 ≃ σ2avg = 154.0 ± 63.9 , (19b)
Group 1+2: l2 ≃ σ2avg = 142.5 ± 55.6 . (19c)
The value obtained in each group separately is the same
within the experimental error. We can improve this result
by recalling that the quantum model we are testing is based
on the inverted harmonic oscillator associated with Hull clas-
sical model. However, we saw that at least subjects 1-7, 2-3,
2-4, and 2-8 follow an oscillatory learning curve. Therefore,
strictly speaking the quantum Hull model does not apply to
these animals. On the other hand, developing a quantum the-
ory over the oscillatory classical model (9) can be more dif-
ficult than for the Hull model (4) because one cannot recast
the model as a simple inverted harmonic oscillator and one
has to deal with the dissipative forces of a damped model. As
a simple way to obviate this problem, we discard the data of
subjects 1-7, 2-3, 2-4, and 2-8 from the estimates of h¯. The
result is a decrease in the error uncertainty:
Group 1 (no 1-7):
l2 ≃ σ2avg = 139.8 ± 33.6 , (20a)
Group 2 (no 2-3, 2-4, 2-8):
l2 ≃ σ2avg = 123.2 ± 59.7 , (20b)
Group 1+2 (no 1-7, 2-3, 2-4, 2-8):
l2 ≃ σ2avg = 132.3 ± 48.0 . (20c)
Thus, the typical response oscillation is similar for all sub-
jects and is large despite the quantum state being very close
to classicality.
Subject Group 1 Group 2
1 2.4 0.9
2 0.6 2.8
3 1.0 3.8
4 4.1 3.5
5 0.8 67.5
6 0.6 0.3
7 0.9 0.5
8 2.2
Average 1.5 ± 1.2 10.2 ± 21.7
Corr. average 2.0 ± 1.3
Table 7
Estimate (17) of h¯ for the individual subjects and in average.
In the corrected average of Group 2, the datum of subject 2-5
(in italics) has been removed.
4. Applying the estimate (18) to Eq. (17) yields h¯ ≃
2αβσ2. This expression is crude and can only give generic
qualitative indications about the viability of the model. Plug-
ging the values of αβ and σ2 for each subject individually,
we get a rather heterogeneous set of values, reported in Tab.
7.
One of the data is especially off the average, namely, subject
2-5. This is due to its extremely high value of αβ ≈ 0.77.
Removing this datum, the average of Group 2 is comparable
with that of Group 1. The grand average is 1.7 ± 1.3. The
uncertainty is of order of the central value and, although the
latter is different from zero within one standard deviation, it
does not constitute a compelling evidence of the validity of
the model.
5. Recalling that there is no trace of color in our data and
that the descriptive stochastic model with white noise is the
best fit, we immediately conclude that the quantum theory,
which also predicts a white-noise spectrum of fluctuations,
adequately describes the signal of all subjects.
Discussion
Holden et al. (2011) and Van Orden et al. (2010) suggested
the hypothesis that response variability could be analogous to
that produced by quantum fluctuations in quantum mechan-
ics. This parallelism was partially motivated by the fact that
human behavior can be affected by its measurement, just like
a quantum system is modified by the act of measuring with
an apparatus. Here we took the analogy ad litteram and, af-
ter having defined the quantum system rigorously, checked
whether it is experimentally viable. We found that response
variability could be interpreted as quantum fluctuations of
the size
δv ∼
√
h¯
2αβ
. (21)
Any other model predicting an αβ-dependent δvwith a differ-
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ent trend in (and magnitude of) the amplitude of fluctuations
would hardly find a subject-independent constant h¯ to a sig-
nificant confidence level. Combining the estimate on h¯ with
the prediction on white noise, we can conclude that data are
compatible with the quantum theory. However, we cannot go
beyond a moderate optimism regarding its validity, since the
error associated with the estimates (19) is rather large, about
30 to 40% of the value. The error in the corrected estimates
(20) is slightly smaller. This uncertainty is due to the esti-
mation of the amplitude of fluctuations by the rough guess
(18). Moreover, statistical white noise can obviously accom-
modate data with a flat stochastic signal. Another potential
source of white noise is the experimental design itself. The
delivery of the US with a uniform distribution during the CS
already introduces a random component that should reflect
in the subjects’ response. Therefore, one would expect white
noise even in the total absence of any “cognitive” or “quan-
tum” mechanism. This random component is already taken
into account in the statistical error, which, as we just noted,
dominates the relation (17) and the estimates (19) and (20).
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
By assuming minimization of the action as a guiding prin-
ciple, we have constructed a new framework of models of
Pavlovian conditioning. The simplest of these models is a
natural extension of Rescorla–Wagner model with one cue
(Hull model in short). Looking at data, we saw that the os-
cillatory classical model (9) with A = 0 and µ , 0 is favored
over Hull’s in 27% to 40% of the experimental cases. The es-
timated dispersion of the session-by-session individual data
with respect to the theoretical curve is about the same for
the Hull and oscillatory models in all the cases where the
latter is clearly favored (Tab. 4). In all the other cases, the
parameter µ is close to zero and Hull model and its exten-
sion coincide. Therefore, all data can be explained by the
extension of Hull model. At a biological level, the explana-
tion of why µ takes different values in different subjects (for
some, as we have seen, µ is close to zero) might reside in
individual differences in brain configuration. Different dy-
namical adaptations of synaptic connections during learning
would give rise to a different damping rate of the oscillations.
Regardless of whether this microscopic interpretation has a
basis in reality or not, the least-action principle states that
learning is a naturally effective process that minimizes the
internal changes in the subject. These changes are observ-
able and can be quantified through the behavioral laws stated
here.
We have also analyzed the quantum theory using Hull
model as the classical layer and found that it could describe
response fluctuations, although we could not find conclusive
evidence. Quantizing the oscillatory model will probably
clarify this open question.
In parallel, using individual trial-by-trial data we have
checked for the presence of colored noise in the frequency
spectrum of the subjects’ response. We found no evidence of
color and all subjects showed a flat (white) noise spectrum
(Tab. 6). The origin of this white noise can be simply statisti-
cal, but we also considered two quantitative models account-
ing for it. One is a descriptive model implementing stochas-
tic fluctuations in the subject’s individual response; specula-
tions about the origin of this noise may find inspiration in the
“1/ f α” cognitive literature, albeit in that case there is estab-
lished evidence of a colored spectrum. The othermodel is not
only descriptive, but also predictive, and interprets response
variability as a manifestation of a process obeying the laws of
quantum mechanics. We tested the predictions of the theory
with data and we found agreement, although the error bars on
the estimates of the “Planck” constant h¯ are too conspicuous
to conclude that the model is correct.
Although data show that individual responses are far from
following the textbook smooth learning curve, they do not
show an “abrupt acquisition” phenomenon either, as some-
times claimed in the literature (see Gür et al., 2018, and refer-
ences therein). Some subjects do show something that could
be described as an abrupt acquisition, but response variabil-
ity is too large throughout the experiment to make this con-
clusion meaningful when, to put it simply, a sharp initial
rise in response is yet another random fluctuation around
the ideal average curve (see Figs. 2 an 4 in the Supplemen-
tal Material). Precisely for the same reason, although it is
true that traditional associative models do not predict abrupt
chances in behavior, our findings do not support representa-
tional or model-based models either (Gür et al., 2018). Re-
sponse variability is so fine grained that its random, nowhere-
differentiable nature is, in our opinion, unquestionable. We
have offered two interpretations about these behavioral fluc-
tuations, stochastic (from cognitive noise component in the
underlying model) or quantum (from a model affected by
quantum uncertainties). Both cases go beyond standard as-
sociationism, but are based on it nevertheless: associative
learning still is an adequate description of averaged data.
The psychological interpretation of the quantum theory
remains open. The idea that quantum mechanics can play
a role in brain processes and in the emergence of conscious-
ness is almost as old as the discipline (see Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy, 2015, for an account) and fostered
debate among psychologists, physicists and philosophers,
sometimes leading to original collaborations between author-
ities in their respective fields (Beck and Eccles, 1992; Bohm,
1990, 2002; Jung and Pauli, 1952; Penrose, 1989; Riccia-
rdi and Umezawa, 1967; Stapp, 2009; Wigner, 1967). Re-
cently, there has been interest in applying quantum mechan-
ics to human cognition and decision making (Bruza et al.,
2009a; 2015; Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012; Busemeyer et
al., 2006; 2009; 2011; 2014; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2011;
Pothos et al., 2017; Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2012; Years-
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ley and Busemeyer, 2015), reinforcement learning (Fakhari
el al., 2013), as well as in the general field of artificial intel-
ligence (Bruza et al., 2009b; Busemeyer et al., 2012). The
role of quantum physics at the time scale of brain processes
(∼ 10 − 100 ms) is still controversial (Hagan et al., 2002;
Tegmark, 2000) and it is not clear whether and how it affects
cognition and behavior. Our main concern here is not the
origin of quantum cognitive or behavioral phenomena, but
the collection of empirical evidence (or the lack of it) in their
favor in the context of animal learning, novel with respect
to the above literature. We may come back to the psycho-
logical interpretation of the quantum Hull model only after
better evidence is gathered. Our results regarding this model
are insufficient to validate it but, at the same time, we hope
they are suggestive enough to elicit the researcher’s curiosity
further.
A difficulty in testing the model in the future may come
from the fact that the constant h¯ is dimensionful. Above, we
always omitted this information, but all values of h¯ in this
paper should be quoted in units of (association strength)2 per
time unit or, more specifically, “(licks)2/trial.” Clearly, these
units become cumbersome when trying to compare values
obtained in different experiments with different dependent
variables and trial duration. At any rate, the priority should
be to verify the constancy of h¯ with independent data, leav-
ing the cross-experimental determination of the actual value
of h¯ as a next-step problem. In particular, one should inves-
tigate whether response fluctuations remain large, constant,
and with a white-noise spectrum also when the US/reinforcer
is presented on a more regular strictly deterministic schedule.
Finally, a word about replicability and applicability. Since
all the models we have presented in the main text of this pa-
per are foundational extensions of the simplest conditioning
process involving simple associations between stimuli and
responses, it may not be necessary to conduct ad hoc ex-
periments to test their validity. The long-range oscillations
of the dynamical model, the spectral properties of response
variations, and all the main features the quantum model can
be checked in any experiment, past or future, that had a suffi-
cient number of sessions (in the case of the dynamicalmodel)
or trials (in the case of the stochastic noise and of the quan-
tum model) and whose design induced a simple conditioning
process. In general, the condition of having many sessions
is much more restrictive than that of having many trials, but
it is not necessary to take or make experiments as lengthy
as ours. Eventually, what one is looking for is cumulative
evidence, and that is achievable with enough experiments of
moderate length. Moreover, our models may obtain confir-
mation or be ruled out by extant or future data not only about
Pavlovian conditioning, but also from the operant condition-
ing literature. In the second case, one invokes the possibility
that associative models can also describe operant behavior
(Killeen and Nevin, 2018).
Supplemental material. Additional figures and data are
available at this Dropbox link.
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Appendix A
DYNAMICAL HULL MODEL WITH FRICTION
Taking the time derivative of (2), we obtain
v¨ + 2αβv˙ + (αβ)2(v − λ) = 0 . (22)
This equation can be derived from the action7
SHull =
∫ T
0
dt L˜Hull , (23)
where the LagrangianLHull reads
L˜Hull = e2αβtLHull , LHull =
v˙2
2
− U(v) , (24a)
U(v) =
(αβ)2
2
(v − λ)2 . (24b)
Let us explain all symbols and the procedure in detail. t is
time and the integral runs from some initial time convention-
ally set to t = 0 to the time t = T when the experiment ends.
7The action (23) is defined up to an overall normalization con-
stant and we can choose such a constant so that the constant accel-
eration term in (22) is 1. In other words, if λ , 0 we can rescale
S Hull → −mS Hull, where m := −(λα2β2)−1 is something we might
call the “conditioning mass.” This is an intuitive measure of the in-
ertia the subject experiences during learning. When the magnitude
or salience of the US or the salience of the CS decrease, the mass |m|
increases and the less efficient the conditioning will be. The heavier
the mass, the longer the learning will take to reach a certain strength
of association. Note that we have chosen the arbitrary rescaling of
the action in such a way that the conditioning mass depends on all
the parameters we would expect to affect the inertia of learning on
empirical grounds. But for practical purposes, one can work with
the original action (23).
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The function v = v(t) is the association strength related to
one CS. The ideal situation of maximal learning corresponds
to T = +∞. For instance, at the beginning of an excita-
tory conditioning the association strength will be v(0) = 0
and its velocity v˙(0) , 0, while at arbitrarily large times
v(+∞) = λ > 0 (some asymptote determined by the mag-
nitude of the US) and v˙(+∞) = 0.
In physics terminology, Eq. (24) corresponds to a
nonrelativistic, classical particle with kinetic energy v˙2/2 >
0 and potential energy U(v). According to the variational
principle in classical mechanics, the dynamical equation for
a particle following a trajectory x(t) is obtained by vary-
ing an action S [x] with respect to a small fluctuation δx
of the degree of freedom x(t) and imposing that the action
is stationary against this fluctuation (δS = 0) when the
latter vanishes at the boundary of the integration domain,
δx(0) = 0 = δx(T ). This means that the motion x(t) solv-
ing the dynamics minimizes the path from point x(0) to point
x(T ). For this reason, the variational principle (8) is also
called the principle of least action. For an action S [v] de-
pending on one degree of freedom v, the equation of motion
(8) is equivalent to the Euler–Lagrange equation
d
dt
∂L˜
∂v˙
− ∂L˜
∂v
= 0 . (25)
It is easy to check that Eq. (22) is given by (25) when applied
to (24). For a generic potential, the equation of motion reads
v¨ + 2αβv˙ + U ′(v) = 0, where the prime is a derivative with
respect to v and the friction term 2αβv˙ is generated by the
prefactor exp(2αβt) in the action. Friction terms can arise
in very different contexts in physics. One is in the dynam-
ics of fields in curved spacetimes. In that case, the prefac-
tor exp(2αβt) would correspond to the volume density factor√−g of space(time). The other way to get friction is by the
conventional non-variational approach to classical mechan-
ics, where the Lagrangian does not depend explicitly on time.
By definition in this case, the equation of motion is not (25)
but
d
dt
∂L
∂v˙
− ∂L
∂v
= Q , Q = −2αβv˙ , (26)
where Q is the friction force. The final result is the same, Eq.
(22). A third way to obtain Hull model, without friction but
with an inverted potential, can be found in section Quantum
Hull model.
The Lagrangian (24a) has a clear interpretation in
physics: it describes the one-dimensional dynamics of a non-
relativistic particle with positivemass and in a potentialU(v).
The particle, or worldline v(t), is nonrelativistic because of
the form of the kinetic term mv˙2/2. It has a positive mass
because, in our case, m = +1. The potential U(v) (Fig. 9)
has a quadratic part, a linear part and a constant term, but it
is just quadratic when expressed in terms of the variable
x := λ − v . (27)
This is the potential of a damped harmonic oscillator, i.e.,
a particle with trajectory x(t) attached to a spring with pos-
itive spring constant k = (αβ)2 and subject to friction. The
classical equation of motion (22) is rewritten as
x¨ + 2Ωx˙ + Ω2x = 0 , Ω := αβ , (28)
where we introduced a “frequency” Ω proportional to the
salience of the US and of the CS. In excitatory conditioning,
the particle rolls down the potential well from the point x = λ
(v = 0) to the globalminimum at x = 0 (v = λ), where it stops
due to the finely tuned friction with damping coefficient 2αβ
(Fig. 9). In extinction, the minimum is shifted to the origin
but the particle behavior is similar, rolling from v = λ down
to v = 0.
The potential (24b) in the Lagrangian (24a) gives rise
to the equation of motion (28), which is very special: the
damping coefficient 2Ω is exactly twice the frequency of the
oscillator. In general, this would be considered as a fine tun-
ing of the parameters of the model because the friction term
makes the particle stop precisely at the bottom of the poten-
tial. If we relax this condition but still allow for friction,
the most natural outcome will be that the particle will start
to oscillate around the minimum of the potential, eventually
sitting on top of it when its kinetic energy is exhausted. This
is achieved simply by changing Eq. (24b) as
U(v) =
(αβ)2 + µ2
2
(v − λ)2 (29)
where µ is a constant. Equation (22) is then replaced by
v¨ + 2Ωv˙ + (Ω2 + µ2)(v − λ) = 0 , Ω = αβ , (30)
whose solution is Eq. (9). This profile has concrete realiza-
tions in electronic engineering and signal processing and is
called “step response” in that context (the oscillatory pattern
is called “ringing”). When µ , 0, the particle is subject to a
friction force Q given by plugging Eq. (9) into Eq. (26).
Appendix B
MULTI-CUE AND VARIABLE-SALIENCE MODELS
For future explorations, we note that it is possible to recast
any model of Pavlovian conditioning as a dynamical system
described by the action
S =
∫ T
0
dt
 N∑
i=1
v˙2
i
2
−
N∑
i=1
Ui(vi) −W(v1, . . . , vN)
 , (31)
where the functions vi = vi(t) are the association strengths
related to N conditioned stimuli (N “particles”), Ui is the po-
tential energy of each particle, and the term W(v1, . . . , vN) is
an interaction describing how the particles affect one another
by cross-terms. The total potential energy of the system is∑
iUi +W.
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Having already discussed the Hull model for a sin-
gle CS (Hull, 1943), we now consider the Rescorla–Wagner
model generalizing Hull model to many stimuli (Rescorla
and Wagner, 1972; Wagner and Rescorla, 1972), the Mack-
intosh attentional model (Mackintosh, 1975b), and a nonlin-
ear approximation to Mackintosh model recently proposed
by one of the authors (Calcagni, 2018). Notice that, in some
cases, it may be more convenient to recast the system with
different variables (if available) than the association strength
in (31).
Classical dynamics of the Rescorla–Wagner model
The Rescorla–Wagner model (Rescorla and Wagner,
1972; Wagner and Rescorla, 1972) is an extension of Hull
model to many conditioned stimuli. The trial-by-trial change
in each strength of association v(i)n , i = 1, . . . ,N, is
∆v(i)n = αiβ
λ −
N∑
j=1
v
(i)
n−1
 , (32)
which, in the continuum limit, translates to the differential
equations
v˙i = αiβ
λ −
N∑
j=1
v j
 , i = 1, . . . ,N , (33)
v¨i = αi

N∑
j=1
α j
 β2
 N∑
k=1
vk − λ
 . (34)
The latter stems from the multiparticle action (31) with
Ui(vi) = −12αi
∑
j
α j
 β2(vi − λ)2 , (35)
W(v1, . . . , vN) = −
∑
j
α j
 β2
∑
i
αivi
∑
k,i
vk
= −
∑
j
α j
 β2 ∑
i
∑
k,i
(αi + αk)vivk , (36)
as one can check from Eq. (25) for each vi. In physics, this
would correspond to a system of interacting, inverted har-
monic oscillators (see section Quantum Hull model for the
single inverted oscillator). It is easy to check that the energy
of each inverted oscillator is not conserved individually due
to interactions.
Classical dynamics of the Mackintosh model and its non-
linear approximation
For one CS, the attentional model by Mackintosh is
described by
∆vn = αn−1β(λ − vn−1) , ∆αn = γ(λ − vn−1) . (37)
In the continuum,
v˙ = βα(λ − v) , α˙ = γ(λ − v) , (38)
which can be combined as ∂t[v − βα2/(2γ)] = 0. Therefore,
v and α are related by
v(t) =
β
2γ
α2(t) + λ − c , (39)
where c is a constant. Plugging this back into (38), one ob-
tains two first-order equations decoupled in v and α, with
unique solutions
v(t) = λ − c sech2

√
γβc
2
t
 , (40a)
α(t) =
√
2γc
β
tanh

√
γβc
2
t
 . (40b)
Since v(0) = λ − c and, for c > 0, v(±∞) = λ, excitatory
conditioning is obtained for c = λ. Comparing with Eq. (3),
one immediately sees that the learning curve of the contin-
uous Mackintosh model is less steep at the beginning of the
conditioning, a phenomenon we dubbed (we will presently
see why) “uphill learning” in Calcagni (2018). Mackintosh’s
model for two or more cues corresponds to a multi-particle
system we will not write down here.
The construction of a Lagrangian is somewhat prob-
lematic for this model. In fact, a priori the strength of as-
sociation v and the salience α of the CS are independent
variables and one should consider a Lagrangian L[v, α] =
v˙2/2 + α˙2/2 − U1(v) − U2(α) −W(v, α) which is varied with
respect to the two degrees of freedom v and α. However,
there is no such action. From (38), we have
v¨ = −β2α2(λ − v) + γβ(λ − v)2 , a¨ = γβα(λ − v) . (41)
If we ask to varyL with respect to v and α independently us-
ing the Euler–Lagrange equations (25), then the first equation
in (41) suggests an interaction termW = β2α2(λv− v2/2)+ d
for some constant d, while the second equation in (41) re-
quires W = γβα2v/2. Even setting d = 0, these two ex-
pressions can never match because the first one has an extra
O(α2v2) term. Therefore, if we insist in describing the model
with a dynamical action, we must first use the relation (39) to
recast Eq. (41) into a single nonlinear differential equation.
Let us do this first for the association strength v. Equation
(40a) can be recast as
v˙ = ±
√
−2U(v) , (42)
U(v) = −γβ(v − λ + c)(v − λ)2
= −γβ[(c − λ)λ2 + (3λ − 2c)λv − (3λ − c)v2 + v3].
(43)
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Notice that the writing (42) is equivalent to v¨ + U ′(v) = 0.
Then, the Lagrangian reads
LMac = v˙
2
2
− U(v) , (44)
while the energy is
EMac = γβ(v − λ − c)(λ − v)2 + U(v) = 0 . (45)
The potential (43) is understood as valid in the interval
0 6 v 6 λ, while outside this interval one should impose
the infinite barriers as in (24).
Mathematically, the only but important difference
with respect to Hull model is in the form of the potential:
a polynomial of order 2 in the Hull case and of order 3 in the
Mackintosh case, with the sign of the linear and quadratic
terms flipped; see Fig. B1. While in the Hull model excita-
tory conditioning is represented by a particle rolling up the
potential towards the absolute maximum, in the Mackintosh
model the particle has first to roll down a trough (the local
minimum in the figure) before climbing up the local maxi-
mum. Defining the action with an overall extra − sign, this
motion consists in climbing up a hill before rolling down the
local minimum; this is the dynamical description of “uphill”
learning.
It may be more convenient to recast the system in
terms of the variable α. The problem of the potential in (44)
is that it is unbounded from below. The solution (40a) is of
“rolling” type, i.e., the particle moves from some initial posi-
tion down to the local minimum or up to the local maximum.
In order to avoid falling indefinitely down or climbing up-
wards the potential, we have imposed the initial conditions
typical of a learning process. However, these initial condi-
tions are rather unnatural inasmuch as they do not correspond
to a local extremum of the potential: so to speak, the particle
starts with non-zero velocity at a slope of the potential. This
configuration is not suitable to describe quantum solutions of
the quantum system, which should always begin from or end
at a static configuration.
Such is the characteristic of the solution (40b). The
second expression in (38) can be written as
α˙ = ±
√
−2U(α) , (46)
U(α) = −1
2
[
γc − β
2
α2
]2
, (47)
corresponding to the Lagrangian
L˜Mac = α˙
2
2
− U(α) . (48)
The potentialU(α) 6 0 is quartic and is bounded from above
(Fig. B2). For c > 0, its two maxima are at α = ±
√
2γc/β.
In particular, to reach the asymptotic value α = 1 it must
be γ = β/(2c). The solution (40b) is a kink interpolating
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Figure B1. Top panel: the solution (40a) of Mackintosh
conditioning model (44) for c = λ = 1, β = 1 and γ = 1/2.
Bottom panel: the potential U(v) (43) for c = λ = 1 and
βγ = 1/2. The particle rolling down the potential represents
the change in the associative strength. The direction of “mo-
tion” in excitatory conditioning is represented by a red arrow.
between these maxima. In the present case, however, t > 0
and the solution runs from the local minimum at α = 0 to the
positive maximum. This corresponds, in particular, to the
excitatory case c = λ.
Let us pause for a moment and discuss a caveat. To
get an extinction curve, one should have v(0) = λ as ini-
tial condition and v(±∞) = 0. Then, setting λ = 0 one
would have to impose c < 0; for this range of values, v and
α remain real valued but become periodic, v ∝ cos−2 and
α ∝ tan. This behavior does not correspond to extinction.
Another possibility is to consider the branch t ∈ (−∞, 0]
that we ignored in all the other models. Since v is even in
time, following v(t) from the infinite past until t = 0 corre-
sponds to decrease the association strength from λ to 0 (Fig.
12). However, this is a solution of the equations of motion
with a nonvanishing parameter λ, which means that the US
is offered at the end of each trial. Clearly, this does not cor-
respond to a realistic extinction experiment. Rather, it is a
sort of “rewinding” of an excitatory experiment backwards
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Figure B2. Top panel: the solution (40b) of Mackintosh
conditioning model (48) for c = λ = 1, β = 1 and γ = 1/2.
Bottom panel: the potential U(α) (47) for c = λ = 1 and
βγ = 1/2. The particle rolling down the potential represents
the change in the salience of the CS. The direction of “mo-
tion” in excitatory conditioning is represented by a red arrow.
in time or, conversely, an excitatory process with a different
parametrization of time (t running from 0 to −∞). The latter
interpretation can also be reached by taking the Mackintosh
proposal as an approximate model and assuming α to sit at
the maximum at α = −
√
2γc/β. In that case, for c = λ
we would have a Hull model with t → −t and the negative
branch would be physically the same as the positive branch.
We conclude this section with a side remark. The sys-
tem of differential equations (38) could be solved exactly,
while the treatment of the discrete system (37) is more com-
plicated. This motivated one of the authors to propose a non-
linear model approximating Mackintosh’s when the parame-
ter γ is very small (Calcagni, 2018). Given two parameters
0 < αmin < αmax 6 1 representing the minimum and maxi-
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
v
UHvL
Figure B3. The quartic potential in (51) (solid curve) com-
pared with (43) (dashed curve), for λ = c = 1, β = 1 and
γ = 0.1.
mum value of the salience of the CS, this model is
αn = αmin + (αmax − αmin)
vn
λ˜
, (49)
∆vn = αn−1β(λ − vn−1)
= β
[
αmin + (αmax − αmin)vn−1
λ˜
]
(λ − vn−1)
= A − Bvn−1 −Cv2n−1 , (50)
where A = βαminλ, B = β(αmin − Cλ), C = (αmax − αmin)/λ˜.
In the continuum, we have v˙ = A − Bv − Cv2, i.e.,
v¨ = −AB + (B2 − 2AC)v + 3BCv2 + 2C2v3 . (51)
The profile U(v) is the same as in Fig. 9 when γ = O(10−2),
while for larger γ the local maximum is lowered (Fig. B3).
If we compare Eqs. (51) and (42), we immediately see
that this nonlinear model collapses to Mackintosh’s model
when the cubic term is negligible, C ≪ 1, which happens if
αmax ≃ αmin ≃ α. All the coefficients can be mapped easily
into one another. For instance, the O(v2) terms in Eqs. (51)
and (42) match if C ≃ γ/α.
Appendix C
OTHERMODELS OF FLUCTUATING RESPONSE
Fractional stochastic model
We want to explore the possibility of a long-range
effect in data or, more precisely, whether the time series
of responses has long-memory correlations. The previous
model accounts for local fluctuations in the response but does
not contemplate the chance that, for whatever reason, the
learning history of the subjects can affect future response
more heavily than predicted by Hull model, in either its
deterministic or stochastic version. This situation is de-
scribed, for instance, by an autoregressive fractionally inte-
grated moving average (ARFIMA) process. Without enter-
ing into many details, we can model this process as follows.
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Figure C1. Learning curve (54) (solid) with γ = 0.5, com-
pared with Hull’s curve (4) (dashed), for λ = 1 = αβ.
In the continuous-time limit, the AR process with drift and
colored noise (14) takes the form V˙(t) = αβ[λ − V(t)] + η(t).
A random ARFIMA-like process with long memory would
be described by
∂
γ
t V(t) = αβ[λ − V(t)] + η(t) , (52)
where ∂γt is a fractional derivative of order γ (Kilbas et
al., 2006). There are many definitions of fractional deriva-
tive; here we will take the left Caputo derivative (∂γ f )(t) :=
[Γ(1 − γ)]−1
∫ t
0
dt′(t − t′)−γ∂t′ f (t′), where Γ is Euler func-
tion and 0 < γ < 1. Fractional derivatives are commonly
employed in statistical, financial, or physical systems with
memory.
In this descriptive model, the biggest impact on be-
havior is given by the fractional derivative rather than the
noise term. For this reason, we can ignore η and consider the
deterministic equation
∂
γ
t v = αβ(λ − v) , (53)
whose solution is the Mittag-Leffler function (Haubold et al.,
2011):
v(t) = λ[1 − Eγ(−αβtγ)] . (54)
When γ = 1, E1(−αβt) = exp(−αβt) and one recovers (4).
The learning curve (54) is shown in Fig. C1. Compared
with Hull’s curve, (54) is steeper at early times and increases
much slower at late times.
The BIC and AIC of the best fit of normalized
session-by-session individual data is shown in Tab. 3. The
fractional model is unfavored by all subjects except 1-4,
which is a false positive: γ = 1 within the error uncertainty.
In fact, all fits select γ = 1 as the value of the fractional expo-
nent. Since the deterministic model (53) does not work, we
can also exclude the stochastic version (52), which exhibits
the same global trend.
Random-fractal model
Calcagni (2018) noted that, instead of a learning
curve, the set of points of the association strength in a Pavlo-
vian conditioning process can be described by a fractal, a
somewhat peculiar set defined recursively whose points can
be totally disconnected from one another and whose dimen-
sion can be noninteger. A learning process is then repre-
sented as a “hopping” on a fractal, each trial or session cor-
responding to an iteration level of the set. This reinterpreta-
tion, applied to the Hull, Rescorla–Wagner, Mackintosh, and
Pearce–Hall models, does not change the prediction of any of
these deterministic (i.e., not involving probabilities) learning
models, but it offers a geometric way to characterize not the
efficiency of a training program per se, but for a given sub-
ject.
For instance, a so-called Cantor set is associated with
Hull model and its dimension (more precisely, Hausdorff di-
mension) is dh(C) = dc(C) = − ln 2/ ln(1 − αβ). We can
calculate this quantity from the individual session-by-session
fits of Tab. 1. There is great variability in the dimension. 1-1:
dh ≈ 2.4, 1-2: dh ≈ 13.1, 1-3: dh ≈ 6.1, 1-4: dh ≈ 0.6, 1-5:
dh ≈ 7.5, 1-6: dh ≈ 7.5, 1-7: dh ≈ 2.9; 2-1: dh ≈ 2.8, 2-
2: dh ≈ 4.0, 2-3: dh ≈ 2.2, 2-4: dh ≈ 1.9, 2-5: dh ≈ 0.5,
2-6: dh ≈ 19.6, 2-7: dh ≈ 11.7, 2-8: dh ≈ 2.7. The
large the saliences αβ, the smaller the dimension (the fractal
set becomes a collection of disconnected sparse points) and
the more efficient the conditioning, i.e., fewer the sessions
needed to reach the asymptote of learning. Such is the case of
subjects 1-4 and 2-5, which maintained a steady response al-
ready in the first 10 sessions. On the other hand, the larger the
dimension the longer it took to reach the asymptote, as was
the case of subjects 1-2, 2-6, and 2-7, all of which showed a
slow steady increase almost until the end of the experiment.
This description, alternative to the usual one, may be
interesting by itself, but the fractal interpretation does more
than that when a random element is introduced. The deter-
ministic model can be extended to a probabilistic one when
the saliences αβ take a random value in a given distribution
with support between 0 and 1. This can happen in different
situations, from a controlled experimental design of partial
reinforcement with randomized schedule (the CS or the US
can be either present or absent at any given trial) to the natu-
ral environment of the subject with everchanging stimuli. Or,
according to the hypotheses put forward in the 1/ f cognitive
literature (section Colored stochastic model of individual be-
havior – Theory), random variations of αβ may happen due
to the internal flickering of the subject’s cognitive modules.
In all cases, because of the characteristics of the geo-
metric interpretation, one expects these random fluctuations
to be relatively small with respect to the absolute asymptote
of learning and progressively damped (Calcagni, 2018). Nei-
ther feature is seen in the data: behavioral fluctuations are not
damped in time can be as large as O(λ) and go well above or
32 GIANLUCA CALCAGNI
below the theoretical asymptote found with the best fit. This
finding does not rule out the fractal picture because, as we
said, it is a repackaging of Hull model in terms of a geomet-
ric language. However, it does limit the scope of application
of random fractals, at least in experimental designs like this
where the US is not presented on a deterministic schedule:
random variations of αβ do not describe observed and ob-
servable response instabilities but, rather, some subdominant
and perhaps undetectable effect.
Appendix D
SPECTRAL ANALYSIS
Assume that a completely noise-free learning curve were de-
scribed by Hull model (4). This curve is smooth at all times
and this should reflect in its frequency decomposition. To see
this, we take its cosine Fourier transform:
v˜(ω) = F [v(t)] := 2
∫ +∞
0
dt cos(ωt) v(t)
= − 2λαβ
(αβ)2 + ω2
+ 2piλδ(ω) , (55)
where ω is the frequency and δ is the Dirac delta distribution
(identically equal to zero for ω , 0 and to ∞ at ω = 0). We
employ the cosine Fourier transform, typically used in signal
processing, because we want a real-valued results and v(t)
has support only in t > 0. Without loss of information, we
can remove the zero mode ω = 0 and restrict the frequency
range to ω > 0 (v˜(−ω) = v˜(ω) is even in ω), so that the delta
term drops out. The power spectral density is then defined as
the modulus square of the Fourier transform of the signal:
S (ω) := |v˜(ω)|2 = 4(λαβ)
2
[(αβ)2 + ω2]2
. (56)
This profile is depicted in Fig. D1 in a log-log scale. Short
frequencies have a constant power up to some point ω0 =
(4λαβ)−2,8 where the spectral density drops steadily to zero.
This means that the profile v(t) is mainly made of frequen-
cies ω . ω0, while frequencies ω ≫ ω0 are not important.
These large frequencies correspond to small-scale details of
v(t) but, since v(t) is completely smooth, its small-scale struc-
ture is empty: zooming into it does not give more informa-
tion. This signal is further distorted by the limited size of
the data sample, by small but smooth ripples. Thus, if data
follow a smooth learning curve different from Hull’s, then
a spectral analysis should find an S (ω) different from that
shown in Fig. D1. By itself, this should draw our interest in
determining the power spectral density of data.
However, the spectral analysis can uncover much
more. In general, data are noisy. This noise can come from
8The first derivative of (56) is proportional to ω/ω0 and is there-
fore small (i.e., S (ω) is approximately constant) when ω/ω0 ≪ 1.
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Figure D1. Power spectral density (56) of the ideal learning
curve (4) for αβ = 1 = λ.
statistical error or from intrinsic sources. Statistical error has
a Gaussian distribution and is therefore white noise. White
noise is a random signal with a uniform probability distri-
bution of frequencies (Fig. D2). In general, random signals
called colored noise can be characterized by the power spec-
tral density (13) (up to an overall constant), where a is a
constant exponent (usually denoted as α in the literature; to
avoid confusion with the CS salience, we change notation
here). White noise corresponds to a = 0, while other popular
cases are pink noise (a = 1, S 1 decreases linearly with the
frequency), Brownian noise (a = 2, S 2 decreases quadrati-
cally), blue noise (a = −1, S −1 increases linearly with the
frequency), and so on (Fig. D2). The spectrum (13) is better
visualized in log-log plot, since in that case the parameter a
is nothing by the slope of the line log S a = −a logω. As
we said above, experimental data of associative learning pro-
cesses are usually noisy at small time scales, i.e., the trial-by-
trial response variation is usually greater than any long-term
variation around the asymptote of learning. Therefore, the
spectral density of a realistic learning curve following Hull
model should be of the form of Fig. D1 with a noise signal
superposed and dominating those frequencies where S (ω)
drops. In other words, the total signal S tot(ω) = S (ω)+S a(ω)
is approximately equal to S tot(ω) ≃ S (ω) (Eq. (56)) at small
frequencies ω . ω0, while S tot(ω) ≃ S a(ω) at large frequen-
cies ω ≫ ω0. Simulated signals of this kind are shown in
Fig. D3. Here we can also appreciate the distortion (smooth
ripples) coming from the limited size of the data sample.
Appendix E
CONSTRUCTION OF THE QUANTUM HULL MODEL
Preliminaries: classical setting
Since the friction term in (22) can introduce unneces-
sary complications, we first recast the classical model as an
inverted harmonic oscillator. Taking the time derivative of
(2) but replacing v˙ with its explicit expression, we obtain the
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Figure D2. Power spectral density (13) of white noise (top,
a = 0), pink noise (middle, a = 1), and blue noise (bottom,
a = −1), simulated with the AudioGenerator of Mathemat-
ica.
equation of motion
v¨ − (αβ)2v + λ(αβ)2 = 0 , (57)
which can be derived from the action
SHull =
∫ T
0
dtLHull−inv , (58)
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Figure D3. Total power spectral density S tot(ω) = S (ω) +
S a(ω) with white noise (top, a =), pink noise (middle, a = 1),
or blue noise (bottom, a = −1), simulated with Mathematica.
Here αβ = 1 = λ and we used a sample size of 200 data
points.
where
LHull−inv = v˙
2
2
− U(v) , (59a)
U(v) =
{
− (αβ)22 (v − λ)2 (0 6 v 6 λ)
+∞ (v < 0 or v > λ) .(59b)
In excitatory conditioning, the particle rolls up its hill-top
potential from the global maximum v = 0 to the point v = λ
at which we placed an infinite potential barrier. This bar-
rier is simply a way to force the dynamics into the interval
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0 6 v 6 λ.
Applying the variational principle, the Euler–
Lagrange equations (25) yield (57). This time, the par-
ticle is attached to a spring with negative spring constant
k = −(αβ)2 < 0. In terms of the variable (27),
x¨ −Ω2x = 0 , Ω = αβ . (60)
The energy of the particle is a constant of motion and it van-
ishes. Since (2) is equivalent to v˙ =
√−2U(v),
EHull :=
v˙2
2
+ U(v) = 0 . (61)
Therefore, no matter what type of conditioning process en-
forced, the initial and final state will have equal energy. The
energy found in (61) vanishes but one can always shift the
potential by a constant that does not appear in the equation
of motion, so that E can take positive or negative values. For
the particle to climb the potential up to the maximum, the
initial kinetic energy Ekin = [v˙(0)]2/2 must be positive in
order to cancel the negative contribution U(0) = −(αβλ)2/2
of the potential. At the final point, Ekin = 0 = U. Thus,
comparing with the friction model, the hill-top model has
the disadvantage of needing a potential barrier and requiring
a somewhat unnatural initial condition (the particle starts ex-
actly at the point on the slope which ensure it reaches the hill-
top asymptotically), but on the other hand it is a conservative
system.
In preparation for the quantum analysis, we recast the
Hull model in Hamiltonian formalism. Defining the momen-
tum
p :=
δSHull
δx˙
= x˙ , (62)
the classical Hamiltonian H := px˙ − L from (24) is
H =
1
2
(p2 −Ω2x2) . (63)
This expression is valid within the well 0 6 x 6 λ. The
variables p and x = λ − v are said to be canonically conju-
gate and their Poisson bracket {A, B} := (∂A/∂x)(∂B/∂p) −
(∂A/∂p)(∂B/∂x) is
{x, p} = 1 . (64)
The general classical solution of the equation of motion (28)
is
x(t) = x0 cosh(Ωt) +
p0
w
sinh(Ωt) , (65)
where x0 = x(0) and p0 = p(0) and the hyperbolic functions
are defined by cosh z := (ez+e−z)/2 and sinh z := (ez−e−z)/2.
The energy is EHull = H[x(t), p(t)] = (p20 −Ω2x20)/2.
Quantization
As we just saw, the usual Hull model is nothing but
the classical inverted harmonic oscillator. The quantum in-
verted oscillator is also well known because it is one of the
few cases that admit a fully analytic treatment (Barton, 1986;
Kemble, 1935; Shimbori and Kobayashi, 2000; Shimbori,
2000; Yuce et al., 2006). We will rely mainly on the results of
Barton (1986), which we will review first and then interpret
them in the fresh context of learning by conditioning. The
starting point is the classical Hamiltonian formalism given
by the Hamiltonian (63) and the Poisson bracket (64) for the
canonical variables x and p. We promote the latter to oper-
ators xˆ and pˆ acting on a Hilbert space whose states Ψ(x, t),
also denoted by 〈x|Ψ〉, are called wave-functions. The po-
sition operator xˆ in the Schrödinger picture can be chosen
to act multiplicatively and the momentum operator pˆ as a
first-order partial differential derivative (this choice is called
position representation):
x→ xˆ := x , p→ pˆ := −ih¯ ∂
∂x
, (66)
where h¯ is a constant. In physics, this would be Planck con-
stant ~ (“h bar”) but in psychology we do not know yet its
magnitude and we call it with another symbol (h¯, “bar h”).
The Poisson bracket (64) is converted into the commutator
{ · , · } → 1
ih¯
[ · , · ] , (67)
where [Aˆ, Bˆ] := AˆBˆ − BˆAˆ. Consequently,
[xˆ, pˆ] = ih¯ . (68)
Denoting by 〈Aˆ〉 = 〈Ψ|Aˆ|Ψ〉 the expectation value of an op-
erator Aˆ on a state |Ψ〉, one defines the standard deviation
∆A =
√
〈Aˆ2〉 − 〈Aˆ〉2. Then, for any quantum state and any
two canonically conjugate operators Aˆ and Bˆ it is easy to
prove Heisenberg uncertainty principle
∆A∆B >
h¯
2
, (69)
stating that one cannot have arbitrarily small standard devia-
tions for both operators at the same time. In the case of the
inverted harmonic oscillator and for symmetric states such
that 〈xˆ〉 = 0 = 〈pˆ〉, we have
〈xˆ2〉〈pˆ2〉 > h¯
2
4
. (70)
If one forces the quantum particle into a state sharply peaked
at a certain position x, then the expectation value of the mo-
mentum cannot be determined with arbitrary accuracy.
To determine how the wave-function Ψ(x, t) evolves
in time and position (association strength), we have to spec-
ify an equation for its dynamics. This is achieved in a stan-
dard way by replacing x and p in Eq. (63) with the operators
(66), yielding the quantum Hamiltonian
Hˆ =
1
2
( pˆ2 −Ω2 xˆ2) = −1
2
(
h¯2∂2x + Ω
2x2
)
. (71)
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Then, the dynamics of Ψ(x, t) is defined by the Schrödinger
equation (
ih¯∂t − Hˆ
)
Ψ(x, t) = 0 , (72)
with boundary conditions to be established later. A first pos-
sibility, appealing because it can allow for a probabilistic
interpretation of the wave-function, is to choose boundary
conditions such that the wave-function vanishes at the walls
x1 and x2 of the potential barrier. However, it is easy to
check that this configuration is not viable (see Appendix F).
Intuitively, a wave-function vanishing at v = 0 and v = λ
would never be able to recover the classical behavior in any
limit, since it would prescribe the absence of the particle at
the initial and final point of the evolution (in other words,
such a wave-function would not describe a conditioning pro-
cess approaching the asymptote v = λ starting from v = 0).
From now on, we consider the case without potential barriers
where the Hamiltonian is given exactly by (71) for all x ∈ R.
It is important to note that there is no quantum no-
tion of a particle at a position x at time t. Given a square-
integrable wave-functionΨ(x, t) such that
∫ +∞
−∞ dx |Ψ(x, t)|2 =
1, the density |Ψ(x, t)|2 determines the probability to find the
particle at a position x at time t. This probabilistic description
of the particle dynamics is not due to our ignorance about the
fine details of the experimental setting or of the theory: it is
an intrinsic indeterminacy of Nature which has been verified
in countless observations in physics. In the case of learning
by conditioning models, we propose a similar setting, where
the strength of association v at any given trial can be deter-
mined only probabilistically by a distribution |Ψ(v, t)|2.
Since, as is well known, the Schrödinger procedure is
equivalent to the path-integral quantization, one can explain
these findings by interpreting “quantum” conditioning as the
superposition, weighted by the classical action (58), of all
possible learning curves from t = 0 to t = T . Many of these
trajectories do not reach optimal learning at t = T and they
interfere with the classical trajectory with optimal learning
producing the above-mentioned effect.
To find the most general solution of (72), we need the
Green function G(x, x′; t), which is the only solution of the
Schrödinger equation that describes a point-wise source at
t = 0. It is easy to check that
G(x, x′; t) =
√
Ω
2piih¯ sinh(Ωt)
exp
{
iΩ
2h¯ sinh(Ωt)
×[(x2 + x′2) cosh(Ωt) − 2xx′]
}
(73)
is solution of (ih¯∂t − Hˆ)G = 0 with Hamiltonian (71), such
thatG(x, x′; 0) = δ(x − x′) (Barton, 1986). Then, the general
solution of (72) is given by the propagation of any wave-
function Ψ(x, 0) in time via G:
Ψ(x, t) =
∫ +∞
−∞
dx′G(x, x′; t)Ψ(x′, 0) . (74)
In fact, (ih¯∂t − Hˆ)Ψ(x, t) =
∫
dx′ [(ih¯∂t − Hˆ)G]Ψ(x′, 0) = 0.
Predictions
Prediction 1: The asymptote of learning is not a
durable achievement. A notable consequence of Heisen-
berg uncertainty principle (70) is that equilibrium configu-
rations cannot last forever. Suppose, for instance, that we
set the initial conditions of the inverted oscillator solution
(65) such that to reproduce excitatory conditioning in Hull
model: x0 = −p0/Ω = λ, x(t) = λe−Ωt. The classical system
evolves from x(0) = λ up to the maximum of the potential at
x(+∞) = 0. Although x = λ − v = 0 is reached asymptoti-
cally in time, in a real situation the subject gets close to this
point in a finite time and, according to the classical theory,
achieves full conditioning. This means that the subject can-
not learn anything more about the association between the
CS and the US: once reached the maximum of the potential,
it will stay there forever. The maximum is a point of unsta-
ble equilibrium, i.e., by “perturbing the particle” a bit (in the
psychological interpretation, this means to stimulate the sub-
ject with some means) it would fall down the potential again
(the subject would “unlearn” the S-S association). Since the
classical model has no such perturbations incorporated, this
occurrence never happens in the usual Hull model. However,
in the quantum Hull model the point of unstable equilibrium
cannot be maintained due to quantum fluctuations and, after
some characteristic sojourn time t∗, the particle is displaced
away from the maximum and the subject shows signs of “un-
learning” (if it falls back to the v < λ side of the hill) or even
of “overlearning” (if it falls down on the v > λ side of the
hill).
Prediction 2: There exists a quantum state such that
response fluctuations do not decrease in time. Let us look
for wave-functions peaked at the classical trajectory (Barton,
1986). Consider the t = 0 Gaussian state
Ψ(x, 0) =
1
(pib2)1/4
exp
[
− (x − x0)
2
2b2
+
i
h¯
p0x
]
, (75)
centered at x = x0 and where b is the distribution width. This
profile minimizes the uncertainty principle (69). In fact, the
expectation values of position and momentum on this state
are
〈xˆ〉 =
∫ +∞
−∞
dx x|Ψ(x, 0)|2 = x0 , (76a)
〈xˆ2〉 =
∫ +∞
−∞
dx x2|Ψ(x, 0)|2 = x20 +
b2
2
, (76b)
〈pˆ〉 = −ih¯
∫ +∞
−∞
dxΨ∗(x, 0)∂xΨ(x, 0) = p0 , (76c)
〈pˆ2〉 = −h¯2
∫ +∞
−∞
dxΨ∗(x, 0)∂2xΨ(x, 0)
= p20 +
h¯2
2b2
, (76d)
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so that an estimate of the size of quantum fluctuations in
position is given by ∆x =
√
〈xˆ2〉 − 〈xˆ〉2 = b/
√
2; then,
∆p =
√
〈pˆ2〉 − 〈pˆ〉2 = h¯/(
√
2b) and
∆x∆p =
h¯
2
. (77)
States saturating Heisenberg principle are called coherent.
Calculating (74) and taking the square, one finds the prob-
ability density
|Ψ(x, t)|2 = 1√
piB2(t)
exp
{
− [x − x(t)]
2
B2(t)
}
, (78)
where x(t) is the classical trajectory (65) and
B2(t) = b2 cosh2(Ωt) +
h¯2
b2Ω2
sinh2(Ωt) . (79)
Thus, the wave packet maintains the Gaussian form and it
saturates Heisenberg principle at all times. At short times,
B2(t) = b2 + (b2Ω2 + h¯2b−2)t2 + O(t4), while at late times
B2(t) ≃ [b2 + h¯2(bΩ)−2]e2Ωt/4. Since B increases with t,
the peak of probability follows the classical trajectory and
it spreads exponentially as time goes by. Therefore, ini-
tially the system evolves almost classically (if b is small
enough) and one can determine with good accuracy the as-
sociation strength v = λ − x of the subject, but at later tri-
als there is a nonzero chance that the subject display a non-
optimal conditioning level, even if the highest probability
is at the asymptotic value v = λ. Quantum fluctuations in-
crease from the initial value b/
√
2 to indefinitely large val-
ues ∆x = B(t)/
√
2 ≃ beΩt/23/2, if h¯ ≪ bΩ. The probability
density for the Hull model is shown in Fig. E1.
Prediction 3: There exists a quantum state such that
response fluctuations are large and almost constant. A
sharply peaked coherent state can be characterized by almost
constant fluctuations. To see how, we make a few steps back
and reflect on a basic property of the quantummodel, doing a
micro-analysis of the fluctuations. In order to understand the
typical time scale involved in quantum fluctuations, one can
calculate the sojourn time t∗ in several but mutually agree-
ing ways which differ from one another by the level of rig-
orousness (Barton, 1986). Here we choose a semi-heuristic
method based on an estimate of 〈xˆ2(t)〉, the expectation value
of the operator xˆ2 in the so-called Heisenberg picture on
a real-valued state |Ψl〉 that minimizes Heisenberg’s uncer-
tainty principle and maximizes t∗ for a given length scale l.
In the Heisenberg picture, states are independent of
t and operators evolve in time by the action of the quantum
Hamiltonian. In particular, the position operator xˆ = xˆ(0)
becomes xˆ(t) = eiHˆt xˆe−iHˆt, and a similar expression holds for
pˆ(t). The criterion defining the sojourn time is established by
the condition
〈Ψl|xˆ2(t)|Ψl〉 6 l2 , 0 6 t 6 t∗ . (80)
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Figure E1. Top: the probability density (78) for the Hull
model with λ = 1, Ω = 1 and b = 0.9, as a function of
x = λ− v and t. Bottom: snapshots of the probability density
at t = 0, 0.3, 0.6, 1 (decreasing thickness) for the same values
of the parameters. Dashed lines indicate the position of the
peak x(t) [Eq. (65) with x0 = −p0 = λ].
The state |Ψl〉 is such that 〈xˆ2(0)〉 = l2 [maximum value of
〈xˆ2(t)〉 at t = 0], 〈xˆ2(t)〉 reaches a minimum at t = t∗/2 and
grows again to l2 at t = t∗. Regarding (65) as the solution in
the Heisenberg picture, we can replace it into (80) and, if we
also require Ψ(x) = 〈x|Ψ〉 to be real, get 〈xˆ0 pˆ0 + xˆ0 pˆ0〉 = 0
and
〈Ψl|xˆ20 cosh2(Ωt) +
pˆ20
Ω2
sinh2(Ωt)|Ψl〉 6 l2 . (81)
A further assumption we make is that |Ψl〉 saturates Heisen-
berg principle (70) (which is valid also in the Heisenberg
picture), so that ∆x(t)∆p(t) = h¯/2 for all t. This is eas-
ily achieved by a wave packet analogous to (75), but now
with a width constant at all times. Concretely, a minimum-
uncertainty state for the oscillator peaked at some x = x¯ is
the wave packet
Ψl(x) = 〈x|Ψl〉 =
1
(pih¯b2
l
)1/4
exp
− (x − x¯)2
2h¯b2
l
 , (82)
where the constant bl depends on l (here h¯b2l plays the role
of b2). In particular, for x¯ = 0 calculations identical to
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those in (76) yield 〈xˆ(t)〉 = 0, 〈xˆ2(t)〉 = h¯b2
l
/2, 〈pˆ(t)〉 = 0,
〈pˆ2(t)〉 = h¯/(2b2
l
), so that Heisenberg principle is saturated
for all t:
〈xˆ2(t)〉〈pˆ2(t)〉 = h¯
2
4
, (83)
just as in the Schrödinger-picture relation (77).
We can make a crude estimate of l by recalling that,
classically, x0 = λ. Then, if the system is close to classicality
at the beginning of the experiment, l2 = 〈xˆ2(0)〉 = O(λ2),
where “O” means “of order of.” Thus, the typical fluctuation
has a size of order of the asymptote, l = δv = O(λ).
Prediction 4: There is a universal constant h¯ that can
be determined by experiments. Saturating inequality (81) at
t = t∗ and using the identity cosh2 z−sin2 z = 1, we can invert
(81) and get
t∗ =
1
2Ω
arccosh z , z =
2l2 − 〈xˆ20〉 + 〈pˆ20/Ω2〉
〈xˆ20〉 + 〈pˆ20/Ω2〉
where arccosh z = ln(z +
√
z2 − 1) is the inverse hyperbolic
cosine. Therefore, z = (1 + 4l2Ω2b2
l
/h¯ − Ω2b4
l
)/(1 + Ω2b4
l
).
Since arccoshz increases monotonically in z, t∗ is maximized
when z attains its maximum value z =
√
1 + 4l4Ω2/h¯2 at
b2
l
= (
√
1 + 4l4Ω2/h¯2 − 1)/(2l2Ω2/h¯). Combining these ex-
pressions with the definition in (28), the final result reads
t∗ =
1
2αβ
ln
2l
2αβ
h¯
+
√
1 +
(2l2αβ)2
h¯2
 . (84)
The sojourn time increases monotonically with l: consis-
tently with the first prediction, it takes longer to see larger
quantum fluctuations. The greater the magnitude of the US,
the greater t∗. This is somewhat intuitive: if the amount of
US at each trial is high, the subject will tend to stay in the
state of maximal conditioning longer. If we present the sub-
ject with 10 drops of saccharin solution, the state of maxi-
mal conditioningwill decay slower than when presentedwith
only one drop per trial.
However, for a fixed λ the sojourn time decreases
with the saliences of the CS and of the US. This bizarre re-
sult may find a rationale if we admit that the total duration
of the acquisition stage may affect the sojourn time at the
asymptote of learning. Higher CS and US saliences lead to
faster learning and the subjects reach the asymptote early,
thus increasing the chance of response fluctuations of the
trials. Conversely, the longer the conditioning process the
lower the chance for the subject to move away from optimal
conditioning once reached.
The magnitude of this effect is determined by the con-
stant h¯, which we assumed to be independent of the stimuli.
Let us consider trial-by-trial individual data, which are those
with better time resolution. The constant h¯ (the analogue of
Planck constant ~ in quantum mechanics) is an external in-
put that can be determined experimentally once the other pa-
rameters are known. While data allow us to find the best-fit
values of αβ and λ, we only have an upper limit on t∗ coming
from the fact that responses vary considerably already from
one trial to the next:
t∗ . ∆ttrial = 1 , (85)
which translates into a lower bound on h¯. To find this bound,
we must approximate Eq. (84). The values of αβ can be
read from Tab. 1 for session-by-session data and from Tab.
5 for trial-by-trial data. In the first case, αβ ∼ 10−2 − 10−1,
while in the second it is even smaller, αβ ∼ 10−3 − 10−2.
Therefore, the approximation αβ≪ 1 holds regardless of the
magnitude of the ratio h¯/l2. If this ratio is of order unity,
an expansion of Eq. (84) in αβ ≪ 1 yields t∗ ≃ 2l2αβ/h¯,
hence h¯ ≃ 2l2αβ/t∗ & 2l2αβ. If instead h¯ ≪ l2, an expan-
sion in l2αβ/h¯ ≫ 1 gives t∗ ≃ (2αβ)−1 ln(2l2αβ/h¯), hence
h¯ ≃ 2l2αβ exp(−2αβt∗) & 2l2αβ exp(−2αβ) ≃ 2l2αβ. In
both cases, we find the same lower limit (17), which is also
consistent with the following argument. We can get a sim-
ple estimate of h¯ by assuming that the Gaussian wave packet
is an appropriate description of the association strength (v)
of the subject. As said above, this state saturates the un-
certainty principle, Eq. (77). On the other hand, we have
not seen an appreciable spread of the distribution of v values
during the experiment, which means that the wave packet is
sharply peaked at the classical trajectory. Therefore, we can
take the classical evolution equation (2) (x˙ = −αβx) and the
classical momentum (62) (p = x˙ = −αβx) to get a rough
estimate of the momentum fluctuations ∆p ∼ αβ∆x (here ab-
solute values are understood), so that Eq. (77) implies (17):
h¯ ∼ 2αβ(∆x)2 ∼ 2αβl2 ∼ 2αβσ2.
Prediction 5: Response variability is described by
white noise. The spectrum of the quantum fluctuations de-
scribed by the state (82) is Gaussian. In fact, a Gaussian
distribution is such that all even-order correlations can be ex-
pressed in terms of the two-point correlation function (Adler,
1981; Adler and Taylor, 2007). In our case, odd higher-
order momenta vanish identically 〈xˆ2n+1〉 = 0, while even
momenta are
〈xˆ2n〉 = (2n − 1)!!
 h¯b2l2
n = (2n − 1)!!〈xˆ2〉n, (86)
where “!!” is the double factorial: N!! = N(N−2)(N−4) · · · .
Thus, n = 1 is the second-order correlation (76b) (with
x0 = 0 and b2 = h¯b2l ), 〈xˆ4〉 = 3〈xˆ2〉2, and so on. A Gaussian
distribution of random fluctuations is precisely white noise.
Appendix F
POTENTIALWITH INFINITE BARRIERS
To determine the general solution of the Schrödinger equa-
tion (72) with potential barriers, we use the procedure of
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Yuce et al. (2006). Plugging the expression Ψ(x, t) =
exp[iΩx2/(2h¯) − Ωt/2]Φ(x, t) into (72) with (71), one gets
iΦ˙ + iΩx∂xΦ + (h¯/2)∂2xΦ = 0. After the variable redefini-
tion x = exp(Ωt) y and a few manipulations, the equation of
motion becomes ie2ΩtΦ˙ + (h¯/2)∂2yΦ = 0. Separating the vari-
ables as Φ(y, t) = φ(y) b(t) with b(t) = exp(ie−2Ωta/Ω) and a
some constant, one obtains (∂2y + 4a/h¯)φ(y) = 0, solved by
φ(y) = A sin(2
√
a/h¯y)+B cos(2
√
a/h¯y). Overall, the general
solution is
Ψ(x, t) = N exp
(
i
Ωx2
2h¯
+ ie−2Ωt
a
Ω
− Ωt
2
)
×
[
A sin
(
2
√
a
h¯
e−Ωtx
)
+ B cos
(
2
√
a
h¯
e−Ωtx
)]
,
(87)
whereN is a normalization constant.
For the wave-function (87) to vanish at x1 = 0 (v = λ
the asymptote of learning), it must be B = 0. We also set
A = 1, since there is an overall constant N . On the other
hand, at the beginning of conditioning (x2 = λ, v = 0) one
has Ψ(λ, 0) = 0 only when the sine vanishes, which happens
when 2λ
√
a/h¯ = npi. This fixes the constant a introduced
earlier:
a = h¯
(
npi
2λ
)2
, n ∈ N. (88)
To fix also N , we note that the wave-function Ψ is normal-
izable only if the position of one of the boundaries moves
as x2 = λeΩt. Therefore, in order to have a probabilistic in-
terpretation of the wave-function we assume that one of the
walls is dynamical. Consequently, integrating |Ψ|2 between
x1 and x2 and imposing the result to be 1, we get∫ λeΩt
0
dx |Ψ(x, t)|2 = N2 λ
2
= 1 ⇒ N =
√
2
λ
. (89)
The final result for the square-integrable wave-function of
the quantum inverted oscillator in a box with moving walls
is
Ψn(x, t) =
√
2
λ
exp
[
i
Ωx2
2h¯
+ ie−2Ωt
h¯
Ω
(
npi
2λ
)2
− Ωt
2
]
× sin
(
npie−Ωt
x
λ
)
, x = λ − v . (90)
The probability distribution of values v is
|Ψn(v, t)|2 = 2
λ
e−Ωt sin2
(
npie−Ωt
λ − v
λ
)
. (91)
Unfortunately, the moving-wall configuration is unviable in
our context. The probability density |Ψ|2 is characterized by
n periodic peaks in the interval λ(1 − eΩt) 6 v 6 λ. As
time increases, the peaks spread in the region −v ≫ 0, which
has no meaningful interpretation in the context of Pavlovian
learning. Therefore, we must abandon the moving-wall case.
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